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PUTTING SHOULDER PADS ON SCHLECK: 
HOW THE BUSINESS OF PROFESSIONAL 
CYCLING COULD BE IMPROVED THROUGH 
A MORE AMERICAN STRUCTURE 
Chris Deubert* 
INTRODUCTION 
t was announced in August 2010 that three-time Tour de France 
winner Alberto Contador, less than a week after his latest victory, 
was leaving his Kazakhstan-based team, Astana, at the end of the sea-
son.1 Contador reportedly rejected a two-year, nearly $13 million deal 
from Astana,2 instead choosing to sign with Bjarne Riis’ Danish-based 
Saxo Bank-SunGard team for a reported two years and $20 million.3 The 
move was particularly notable because Contador was essentially replac-
ing rider Andy Schleck, who announced that at the end of the 2010 sea-
son he would be leaving Riis’ squad to form a team based in his native 
Luxembourg.4 Schleck finished second to Contador in both the 2009 and 
2010 Tours de France, including a controversial thirty-nine second victo-
ry in 2010.5 
                                                                                                             
* J.D./M.B.A., Fordham University School of Law and Graduate School of Business, 
New York, NY; B.S., Sport Management, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, MA. 
The author can be reached at cdeubert@gmail.com and he rides a Specialized bicycle. He 
would like to thank his fiancée, Erin Gaffey (LeMond bicycle), for inspiring this Article. 
 1. Alasdair Fotheringham, Contador Quits Astana to Replace Rival Schleck, INDEP. 
(U.K.), Aug. 4, 2010, at 54, available at 
http://www.independent.co.uk/sport/general/others/cycling-contador-quits-astana-to-
replace-rival-schleck-2042336.html (reporting that Contador turned down approximately 
£4.1 million (about $6.3 million) annually); Andrew Hood, Bjarne Riis Signs Alberto 
Contador for the 2011 Saxo Bank-Sungard Team, VELO NEWS (Aug. 12, 2010, 5:13 PM), 
http://velonews.competitor.com/2010/08/news/riis-signs-contador_132572 [hereinafter 
Hood, Riis Signs Contador]. 
 2. Fotheringham, supra note 1. 
 3. Contador Signs Two-Year Deal with Saxo Bank-SunGard, EL PAÍS (Madrid), 
Aug. 4, 2010, at 6. 
 4. Richard Moore, Cycling: Tour Champion Contador to Replace Schleck at Saxo 
Bank, GUARDIAN (London), Aug. 4, 2010, at 7; Ben Atkins, Andy Schleck Confirms Saxo 
Bank Departure, VELONATION (July 30, 2010, 10:44 AM), 
http://www.velonation.com/News/ID/5070/Andy-Schleck-confirms-Saxo-Bank-
departure-destination-still-to-be-announced.aspx. 
 5. Contador in Yellow as Schleck Suffers Untimely Mechanical at the Tour. 
France’s Voeckler Wins the Stage, VELO NEWS (June 22, 2011, 2:46 PM), 
http://velonews.competitor.com/2010/07/news/contador-in-yellow-as-schleck-suffers-
untimely-mechanical-at-the-tour-frances-voeckler-wins-the-stage_129933. Entering 
Stage 16 of the 2010 Tour de France, an important mountain stage, Schleck held a thirty-
I 
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While it was not as controversial as Brett Favre forcing his way onto 
the Minnesota Vikings6 or Johnny Damon signing with the New York 
Yankees,7 just weeks prior to Contador’s signing, anyone who rooted for 
Team Saxo Bank8 also ardently rooted against the Spaniard Contador and 
Astana. Surely the Saxo Bank fans questioned their loyalty to the team in 
light of its signing of Contador. Moreover, by the start of the 2011 sea-
son, Contador had brought three former Astana riders with him to Saxo 
                                                                                                             
one second lead over Contador. Juliet Macur, Etiquette Debate Follows Tour De France 
Lead Change, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2010, at B.11. However, on a decisive climb that day, 
Schleck’s bike chain became dislodged, forcing Schleck to stop and repair it. David Roth, 
Contador Wins by One Bike Chain, WALL ST. J. BLOG (July 26, 2010, 10:34 AM), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/dailyfix/2010/07/26/contador-wins-by-the-length-of-one-bike-chain. 
While Schleck was forced to stop, Contador rode on, in a move some said was against 
unwritten rules not to attack a rider who has stopped through no fault of his own. See id. 
Contador took thirty-nine seconds on the stage to take an eight second lead over Schleck. 
Id. On the Tour’s penultimate stage, the individual time trial, Contador added thirty-one 
more seconds to his lead to win the 2010 Tour by thirty-nine seconds—the exact margin 
that Contador obtained as a result of Schleck’s mechanical problems in Stage 16. Id. 
 6. See generally Jim Corbett, Legendary NFL QB Shows No Quit in His Love for 
Game, USA TODAY, Aug. 21, 2009, at A.1. Favre was the quarterback of the NFL’s 
Green Bay Packers from 1992 through 2007, during which he won three MVP awards 
and led the team to a 1997 Super Bowl Championship. Id. Favre often contemplated re-
tirement and announced his decision to leave the game following the 2007 season, open-
ing the door for young Packers’ quarterback Aaron Rodgers. Id.; Hank Gola, Packers 
Ready to Move On Without Legendary Leader, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Aug. 8, 2008, at 80. A 
few weeks later Favre changed his mind, having felt forced out by the Packers. Corbett, 
supra. Favre reportedly wanted to play for the Packers’ division rival, the Minnesota 
Vikings. Gola, supra. Instead, the Packers traded Favre and the three years remaining on 
his contract to the New York Jets on the condition that if the Jets traded Favre to the Vi-
kings the Jets would owe the Packers three first round draft picks. Id. After a disappoint-
ing 2008 season, Favre again announced his retirement, causing the Jets to release him. 
Corbett, supra. Ultimately still bitter about his departure from the Packers, Favre signed 
with the Vikings for the 2009 season. Id. 
 7. Pete Caldera, Johnny Be Good; Damon Final Piece of Explosive Yankee Lineup, 
REC. (N.J.), Dec. 24, 2005, at S.01. Damon was the centerfield on the Boston Red Sox 
from 2002 through 2005, helping lead them to a World Series title in 2004—the fran-
chise’s first since 1918. Tom Haudricourt, 2004 World Series at a Glance, MILWAUKEE J. 
SENTINEL, Oct. 23, 2004, at 04; Dan Shaughnessy, Yes!!! Red Sox Complete Sweep, Win 
First Series in 86 Years, BOS. GLOBE, Oct. 28, 2004, at A1. Following the 2005 season, 
Damon signed a four-year, $52 million deal with the Red Sox’s arch rival the New York 
Yankees, with whom he won a World Series in 2009. Caldera, supra; Jayson Stark, Da-
mon Steals the Show in Game 4, ESPN (Nov. 1, 2009), 
http://sports.espn.go.com/mlb/playoffs/2009/columns/story?columnist=stark_jayson&id=
4615712. 
 8. Team Saxo Bank-SunGard was known as just Team Saxo Bank prior to the 2011 
season. Hood, Riis Signs Contador, supra note 1. 
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Bank-Sungard9 and Schleck successfully wooed four former Saxo Bank 
riders to his new Leopard Trek team.10 This would be similar to the Yan-
kees suddenly acquiring four of their starters from their arch rival Boston 
Red Sox. 
This type of mass free agency in cycling is of questionable value. The 
advent of free agency in American professional sports has made roster 
changes an accepted part of the game, causing some commentators (no-
tably comedian Jerry Seinfeld) to note that we merely “root for laun-
dry.”11 Nevertheless, the degree and nature of the turnover in profession-
al cycling can quickly strip away any of laundry’s meaning. Undoubted-
ly, many 2010 Saxo Bank supporters found themselves rooting for Leop-
ard Trek in 2011. 
Rider movement is certainly not cycling’s biggest problem. More than 
anything else, doping scandals have sundered the sport by chasing away 
sponsors, destabilizing team operations, and causing annual chaos among 
riders.12 At the time of writing of this Article, the status of Contador’s 
2010 Tour de France title and cycling career hangs in the balance due to 
doping allegations.13 
                                                                                                             
 9. Riis Signs Noval, Hernandez and Navarro for Saxo Bank-Sungard, VELO NEWS 
(Aug. 12, 2010, 5:24 PM), http://velonews.competitor.com/2010/08/news/riis-signs-
noval-hernandez-and-navarro-for-saxo-bank-sungard_134385. The three riders that left 
Astana for Saxo Ban-SunGard were Benjamin Noval, Jesus Hernandez, and Daniel Na-
varro. Id. 
 10. Andrew Hood, Riis Not Losing Sleep Over ‘Leopard-Shack’ Merger, VELO NEWS 
(Sept. 7, 2011, 9:23 AM), http://velonews.competitor.com/2011/09/news/riis-not-losing-
sleep-over-leopard-shack-merger_191207. The riders who left Saxo Bank for Leopard 
Trek were: Frank Schleck, Stuart O’Grady, Fabian “Spartacus” Cancellara, and Jens 
Voigt. Id. 
 11. Steve Buckley, Light’s Fight Not Too Bright, BOS. HERALD, Nov. 26, 2008, at 60; 
Kevin Modesti, Stadiums Not Just Buildings, DAILY NEWS (L.A.), July 16, 2008, at C.1; 
Scott Ostler, This Latest Squabble Won’t Stand Test of Time, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 13, 2007, 
at D.1. The phrase means that fans root for the team jerseys rather than the individuals 
wearing them. 
 12. John Ward Anderson, Doping Scandal Rocks Cycling, WASH. POST, July 1, 2006, 
at E.1. 
 13. Alberto Contador Tests Positive for Clenbuterol, CYCLINGNEWS (Sept. 30, 2010, 
10:06 AM), http://www.cyclingnews.com/news/alberto-contador-tests-positive-for-
clenbuterol [hereinafter Contador Tests Positive]; Juliet Macur, Second Failed Test Puts 
Heat on Contador, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2010, at B.11. In September 2010, it was revealed 
that Contador had tested positive for the banned substance clenbuterol during the 2010 
Tour de France. Contador Tests Positive, supra. It was later revealed that another urine 
test of Contador’s taken during the Tour de France contained plastic residue indicative of 
blood doping. Macur, supra. The Spanish Cycling Federation accepted Contador’s ex-
cuse that the failed tests were the result of eating tainted beef and declined to suspend 
Contador. Contador Tests Positive, supra; UCI Appeals Contador Decision to Court of 
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While the freedom of contract and employment opportunity is some-
thing to be celebrated considering the history of control exercised by 
teams over their athletes across many sports, there are superior business 
models that would improve the operations and financial viability of pro-
fessional cycling while also making it more comprehensible and appeal-
ing to the fans. This Article will explain the current structure of interna-
tional professional cycling and compare it to the typical structure of 
American professional team sports. Lastly, this Article will explain key 
areas where the structure and operations of professional cycling could be 
improved by adopting a more American approach. 
I. CURRENT STRUCTURE OF PROFESSIONAL CYCLING 
A. International Cycling Union  
Based in Aigle, Switzerland, the International Cycling Union, or Union 
Cycliste Internationale (“UCI”) in French, is a nongovernmental, non-
profit, international association in accordance with Swiss law.14 The UCI 
was created in 1900 and governs the world of cycling, including Olympic 
participation.15 The members of the UCI are the national cycling federa-
tions of each country.16 As of 2011, more than 170 nations have a cycling 
federation as a participating member in the UCI.17 Each national federa-
tion sends representatives to the UCI, which constitute the Congress of 
the UCI.18 The Congress then elects a President of the UCI and nine oth-
er persons to form the Management Committee.19 The President and the 
                                                                                                             
Arbitration for Sport, CYCLINGNEWS (Mar. 24, 2011, 1:56 PM), 
http://www.cyclingnews.com/news/uci-appeals-contador-decision-to-court-of-arbitration-
for-sport [hereinafter UCI Appeals]. The UCI appealed to the Court of Arbitration for 
Sport and a hearing is set for November 2011. Contador CAS Hearing Postponed until 
November, CYCLINGNEWS (July 26, 2011, 3:54 PM), 
http://www.cyclingnews.com/news/contador-cas-hearing-postponed-until-november; 
UCI Appeals, supra. 
 14. Union Cycliste Internationale [UCI] [International Cycling Union], UCI Constitu-
tion, ch. II, art. 4, at 2 (Oct. 1, 2010) [hereinafter UCI Constitution], available at 
http://www.uci.ch (follow “Rules” hyperlink; then follow “Constitution” hyperlink). 
 15. UCI, UCI Cycling Regulations: Part XI: Olympic Games, ch. I, para. 11.1.001, at 
1 (Sept. 30, 2010) [hereinafter UCI Regulations, Part XI], available at http://www.uci.ch 
(follow “Rules” hyperlink; then follow “Part XI: Olympic Games” hyperlink). 
 16. UCI Constitution, supra note 14, ch. II, art. 4, at 2. 
 17. See National Federations, UCI, 
http://www.uci.ch/templates/UCI/UCI1/layout.asp?MenuId=MTI2NjU&LangId=1 (last 
visited Oct. 7, 2011). 
 18. UCI Constitution, supra note 14, ch. IV, art. 27, at 9. 
 19. Id. art. 29(e), at 9. 
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Management Committee are elected every four years.20 Since 2006, for-
mer professional cyclist Pat McQuaid has served as President of the 
UCI.21 
In addition to the national federations, there are five continental con-
federations—Africa, America, Asia, Europe, and Oceania—grouping the 
nations of each continental region into a single entity.22 Each of these 
continental confederations appoints delegates to vote on possible 
amendments to the UCI Cycling Regulations presented to the Congress.23 
The number of votes for each continental confederation varies, presuma-
bly based on the continent’s perceived role in professional cycling: Afri-
ca has seven voting delegates; America, nine; Asia, nine; Europe, four-
teen; and Oceania, only three, for a total of forty-two.24 The Congress 
meets annually25 to debate and consider the issues, which are then pre-
sented to it by the Management Committee, and to be voted on by the 
voting delegates.26 In the case of a tied vote, the proposal is rejected.27 
The UCI Cycling Regulations are extensive in nature and govern near-
ly all the rules of cycling in eight different disciplines,28 including the 
licensing of riders, teams, team managers,29 equipment,30 race length and 
conditions, rider contracts and salaries,31 and drug testing.32 The UCI’s 
structure, rules and purpose are substantially the same as other interna-
tional sporting organizations such as Fédération Internationale de Foot-
                                                                                                             
 20. Id. art. 48, para. 3, at 14. 
 21. Patrick McQuaid, UCI, 
http://www.uci.ch/templates/UCI/UCI1/layout.asp?MenuId=MTI2NzU&LangId=1 (last 
visited Oct. 7, 2011). 
 22. UCI Constitution, supra note 14, ch. III, art. 23, at 7. 
 23. Id. ch. IV, art. 36, para. 1, at 11. 
 24. Id. ch. IV, art. 36, para. 2, at 11. 
 25. Id. ch. IV, art. 28, para. 1, at 9. 
 26. Id. ch. IV, art. 31, at 10. 
 27. Id. ch. IV, art. 38, para. 1, at 11. 
 28. The eight different disciplines are road, track, mountain bike, cyclo-cross, BMX, 
trials, indoor cycling and para-cycling. See, e.g., UCI, UCI Cycling Regulations: Part II: 
Road Races (July 1, 2011) [hereinafter UCI Regulations, Part II], available at 
www.uci.ch (follow “Rules” hyperlink; then follow “Part II: Road Races” hyperlink). 
 29. UCI, UCI Cycling Regulations: Part I: General Organisation of Cycling as a 
Sport, ch. I, § 1, art. 1.1.010, at 2–3 (July 1, 2011) [hereinafter UCI Regulations, Part I], 
available at www.uci.ch (follow “Rules” hyperlink; then follow “Part I: General organi-
sation of cycling as a sport” hyperlink). 
 30. Id. ch. III, § 1, art. 1.3.001, at 57. 
 31. See UCI Regulations, Part II, supra note 28. 
 32. See UCI, UCI Cycling Regulations: Part XIV: Anti-Doping, (July 1, 2011) [here-
inafter UCI Regulations, Part XIV], available at www.uci.ch (follow “Rules” hyperlink; 
then follow “Part XIV: Antidoping Rules” hyperlink). 
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ball Association (“FIFA”) and Fédération Internationale de Basketball 
(“FIBA”).33 
The UCI also hosts cycling events in addition to its regulatory role, 
though not the most prestigious ones, as will be discussed in more detail 
below.34 The UCI Constitution specifically designates the Court of Arbi-
tration for Sport (“CAS”),35 also based in Switzerland, as “the sole com-
petent authority to deal with and judge appeals” of decisions made by the 
UCI, applying Swiss law if necessary.36 
B. Teams 
Licenses are required for nearly all persons who are involved in pro-
fessional cycling, including riders, motorcycle pacers, team managers, 
coaches, doctors, mechanics, announcers, and race organizers.37 The li-
cense confirms that “its holder undertakes to respect the [UCI] constitu-
tion and regulations” thereby authorizing him or her to participate in cy-
cling events.38 While individual team members and staff must be li-
censed, teams themselves must register with the UCI.39 There are two 
types of registered teams relevant to professional road cycling: ProTour 
teams and Professional Continental teams. 
                                                                                                             
 33. For more information on FIBA, including its regulations, see About FIBA, FIBA, 
http://www.fiba.com/pages/eng/fc/FIBA/quicFact/p/openNodeIDs/889/selNodeID/889/qu
icFacts.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2011); Official FIBA Regulations, FIBA, 
http://www.fiba.com/pages/eng/fc/FIBA/ruleRegu/p/openNodeIDs/916/selNodeID/916/fi
baRegu.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2011). For more information on FIFA, including its 
regulations, see Laws and Regulations, FIFA, 
http://www.fifa.com/aboutfifa/officialdocuments/doclists/laws.html (last visited Sept. 16, 
2011); Mission & Statutes, FIFA, 
http://www.fifa.com/aboutfifa/organisation/mission.html (last visited Sept. 16, 2011). 
 34. See discussion infra Part II.D. 
 35. UCI Constitution, supra note 14, ch. XIII, at 21. The Court of Arbitration for 
Sport (“CAS”) is an international arbitration body set up to settle disputes related to 
sports. Its headquarters are in Lausanne; there are additional courts located in New York 
City and Sydney, with ad-hoc courts created in Olympics host cities as required. For 
more information on the CAS, see 20 Questions about the CAS, CT. ARB. FOR SPORT, 
http://www.tas-cas.org/en/20questions.asp (last visited Oct. 3, 2011); see generally Jason 
Gubi, The Olympic Binding Arbitration Clause and the Court of Arbitration for Sport: An 
Analysis of Due Process Concerns, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 997 
(2008); Richard H. McLaren, Twenty-Five Years of the Court of Arbitration for Sport: A 
Look in the Rear-View Mirror, 20 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 305 (2010). 
 36. UCI Constitution, supra note 14, ch. XIII, at 21. 
 37. UCI Regulations, Part I, supra note 29, ch. 1, § 1, art. 1.1.001, at 1. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. ch. 1, § 3, art. 1.1.041, at 11. 
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i. ProTour Teams 
Each year the UCI issues a maximum of eighteen ProTour team licens-
es.40 The ProTour license grants the licensed team the right to participate 
in the UCI WorldTour,41 to be discussed in more detail later.42 There are 
four criteria upon which the UCI awards licenses: sporting, ethical, fi-
nancial, and administrative.43 While the sporting criteria considers the 
team’s previous performance,44 the ethical, financial, and administrative 
criteria are important in a sport plagued by doping scandals,45 lacking 
major revenue streams, and where team financial viability has been an 
issue in the past.46 In considering whether a team has satisfied these crite-
                                                                                                             
 40. UCI Regulations, Part II, supra note 28, ch. XV, §3, art. 2.15.009, at 82. 
 41. Id. ch. XV, § 2, art. 2.15.003, at 82. 
 42. See infra text accompanying notes 40–52. 
 43. UCI Regulations, Part II, supra note 28, ch. XV, § 3, art. 2.15.011, at 83. 
 44. A team ranked in the top fifteen will be deemed to have satisfied the sporting 
criteria. A team ranked lower than twentieth shall not be considered to have satisfied the 
sporting criterion, while teams ranked sixteen to twenty are examined more closely. Id. 
ch. XV, § 3, art. 2.15.011a–b, at 83. 
 45. The use of illegal drugs in cycling is so prevalent in the sport’s history that there 
is a Wikipedia page entitled “List of doping cases in cycling” dating all the way back to 
1886. See List of Doping Cases in Cycling, WIKIPEDIA, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_doping_cases_in_cycling (last updated Sept. 17, 
2011). Among the more recent scandals, in 1998 the entire Festina team was thrown out 
of the Tour de France and many other teams quit the race, John Ward Anderson, Down-
hill Ride; Has Cycling Bottomed Out? Will the Sport Rebound or Continue to Self-
Destruct?, HAMILTON SPECTATOR (Can.), May 30, 2008, at 8; Simon Hart, The Road to 
Ruin: Timeline of the Relentless Scandals that Keep Haunting the Sport, DAILY 
TELEGRAPH (London), May 21, 2010, at 10; in 2006 former Tour de France winner Jan 
Ullrich was forced out of the Tour de France the night before as part of a doping investi-
gation, Anderson, supra; Hart, supra; 2006 Tour de France winner Floyd Landis tested 
positive for blood doping and had his title revoked, Anderson, supra; Hart, supra; in 
2007, the leader of the Tour de France, Michael Rasmussen was kicked out mid-tour for 
lying about his pre-race whereabouts and missing drug tests, Leader Rasmussen Kicked 
Off Tour, IRISH EXAM’R (July 26, 2007), 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/758388530/fulltext?accountid=37371; and in 2008 
defending champion of the Tour de France, Alberto Contador, was unable to defend his 
title because his Astana team was involved in a doping scandal, Astana Banned From 
Tour de France; Contador Likely Won’t Defend Title, ESPN (Feb. 13, 2008, 4:14 PM), 
http://sports.espn.go.com/oly/cycling/news/story?id=3243640. 
 46. In mid-season 2003, team sponsor Coast was replaced by Bianchi after Coast was 
unable to pay riders and staff for several months. Alasdair Fotheringham, Ullrich Reach-
es Crossroads in Tour of Troubles; Former Champion Aims to Puts [sic] His Career 
Back on Track from the Ruins of Alcohol, Drugs and Team Bankruptcy, INDEP. (U.K.), 
June 9, 2003, at 6 [hereinafter Fotheringham, Ullrich Reaches Crossroads], available at 
2003 WLNR 10452766. In 2001, the British Linda McCartney Cycling Team, was unable 
to pay its riders for several months, leading the UCI to file a criminal complaint against 
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ria, the UCI will examine the team’s anti-doping compliance,47 satisfac-
tion of contractual and legal obligations,48 financial records,49 and com-
pliance with UCI regulations.50 As a condition of registering as a Pro-
Tour team, the team agrees to participate in the biological passport pro-
gram51 and be subject to the UCI’s anti-doping rules.52 
While teams are often associated with their title sponsor, such as Team 
RadioShack or Saxo Bank, the team’s actual legal name will likely be 
something different than that of its sponsor, which may not be associated 
with the team in a year or two.53 Each team is a legal entity, such as a 
corporation or limited liability company, created under the laws of one of 
various countries. While in American sports the owner of a professional 
sports team is often publicly known,54 this is not the case in professional 
                                                                                                             
the team alleging that a fraudulent bank guarantee was presented to the UCI. See Kieran 
Daley, Union Presses Case Against Defunct Team, INDEP. (U.K.), Mar. 7, 2001, at 29, 
available at 2001 WLNR 7209761. 
 47. UCI Regulations, Part II, supra note 28, ch. XV, § 3, art. 2.15.011c, at 83. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. ch. XV, § 3, art. 2.15.011d, at 83. 
 50. Id. ch. XV, § 3, art. 2.15.011e, at 83. 
 51. Id. ch. XV, § 4, art. 2.15.070a, at 95. The biological passport program is adminis-
tered by the UCI and the World Anti-Doping Association (“WADA”). 
A biological passport is an individual, electronic record for each rider, in which 
the results of all doping tests over a period of time are collated. The passport 
for each rider will contain: (1) results of individual urine tests; (2) results of in-
dividual blood tests; (3) a haematological profile consisting of the combined re-
sults of haematological parameters analysed in a series of blood samples; and 
(4) a steroid profile consisting of the combined results of steroid levels in a se-
ries of urine samples. 
Id. For more information, see Biological Passport – Questions / Answers, UCI (Feb. 9, 
2011), 
http://www.uci.ch/templates/UCI/UCI2/layout.asp?MenuId=MTU4ODY&LangId=1. 
 52. UCI Regulations, Part XIV, supra note 32, ch. I, r. 1, at 1. The UCI anti-doping 
rules are based on the World Anti-Doping Code as approved by the WADA. See id. 
“WADA was established in 1999 as an international independent agency composed and 
funded equally by the sport movement and governments of the world. Its key activities 
include scientific research, education, development of anti-doping capacities, and moni-
toring of the World Anti Doping Code.” About WADA, WORLD ANTI-DOPING AGENCY 
[WADA] (June 2011), http://www.wada-ama.org/en/About-WADA. The WADA Code is 
used for the Olympics and most other international athletic competitions. Id. 
 53. See Thomas A. Valentinsen, Riis Cycling Announces 2011 Team SunGard-Saxo 
Bank, ROADCYCLING.COM (Aug. 3, 2010, 1:40 AM), 
http://www.roadcycling.com/articles/Riis-Cycling-Announces-2011-Team-SunGard—-
Saxo-Bank—-Saxo-Bank-to-Continue-Cooperation-with-Riis-Cycling_003785.shtml. 
 54. Some owners become symbolic or iconic and are more associated with the team 
than any player or coach. Such figures include the late George Steinbrenner of the New 
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cycling. Bjarne Riis, a former Tour de France winner,55 is a notable ex-
ception as the owner and team manager of Riis Cycling. Riis Cycling 
(originally named Professional Cycling Denmark) was formed in 1998 
following Riis’ retirement as a professional rider.56 However, on any 
media platform, Riis Cycling’s team is not referred to as “Riis Cycling” 
but instead by its corporate sponsor as will be discussed below.57 
An athlete’s involvement with the team can create confusion: follow-
ing doping allegations by former teammate Floyd Landis in May 2010, 
the federal government opened an investigation into Lance Armstrong 
and the teams that helped him win seven consecutive Tours de France 
from 1999 to 2005.58 From 1996 through 2004 the team, Capital Sports 
and Entertainment, LLC, was sponsored by the United States Postal Ser-
vice, and in 2005 the team was sponsored by the Discovery Channel.59 
As the investigation began, Armstrong repeatedly countered the descrip-
tion of those teams being “his teams” by stating he was simply a rider 
(employee) with no ownership interest in the team.60 However, prior to 
the 2005 season, Armstrong was given an 11.5% equity interest in the 
team, though he was still not involved in the operations of the team.61 
The team exited pro cycling in 2007 but returned for the 2010 cycling 
season as Armstrong was completing his comeback. It is believed that by 
then Armstrong had obtained a much larger interest in the team, as he 
was essential to the team’s major sponsorship agreements, including Ra-
                                                                                                             
York Yankees or Al Davis of the NFL’s Oakland Raiders. See Cam Inman, Op-Ed., Da-
vis Could Learn a Thing or Two from the Boss, OAKLAND TRIBUNE, Oct. 30, 2009, avail-
able at 2009 WLNR 21746037. 
 55. Riis won the 1996 Tour de France but it was later revealed that he used perfor-
mance enhancing drugs during his career and in that race. See Riis: We’ve Come Clean, 
ADVERTISER (Austl.), Aug. 5, 2010, at 76. 
 56. See Tour Team History Part 2, ROAD BIKE ACTION MAG. (July 20, 2009), 
http://www.roadbikeaction.com/RBA-Features/content/197/1955/Tour-Team-History-
Part-2.html; Matt Rendell & Susanne Horsdal, Life after Lance, OBSERVER (London), 
July 2, 2006, at 34. 
 57. See infra text accompanying notes 65–67. 
 58. Juliet Macur, Armstrong Distances Himself from Doping Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 15, 2010, at B11; Race Winners Since 1903, LE TOUR DE FRANCE, 
http://www.letour.fr/2011/TDF/HISTO/us/palmares.html (last visited Sept. 24, 2011) 
[hereinafter Macur, Armstrong Distances Himself]. 
 59. Dean Bonham, Armstrong Adds Kick to Postal Service Efforts, ROCKY MTN 
NEWS, May 12, 2001, at 4.C; The History of Race Cycling, DISCOVERY CHANNEL, 
http://www.yourdiscovery.com/team/history/index.shtml (last visited Oct. 2, 2011). 
 60. Macur, Armstrong Distances Himself, supra note 58. 
 61. Id.; Bonnie D. Ford, Lance’s Comments Differ from Testimony, ESPN (July 14, 
2010, 7:08 PM), http://sports.espn.go.com/oly/cycling/news/story?id=5380225. 
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dioShack, Nike, Trek, and Nissan. Nevertheless, a rider having an equity 
ownership in the team is extraordinarily rare. 
Once the team is formed as a legal entity, it must obtain sponsorship to 
maintain financial viability. The sport of cycling, despite drawing mil-
lions of spectators each year,62 cannot charge admission based on its in-
herent nature as a distance event. Consequently, nearly all of a team’s 
revenue comes from sponsors who find it beneficial to associate them-
selves with that team.63 These sponsors cover a variety of industries, 
though many obviously relate to cycling. The team’s most important 
sponsors are the “principal partners” whose names and color schemes 
will be used as the team name and make up the bulk of the team’s uni-
form.64 
For example, Riis Cycling was originally named “Team home—Jack 
& Jones” for the Danish-based clothing company.65 The team has since 
undergone several name changes as its principal sponsors have 
changed.66 The team began to achieve more success when it brought on 
the American company Computer Sciences Corporation (“CSC”) as a 
principal sponsor in 2001.67 
Unfortunately the history of doping in the sport has significantly hin-
dered sponsorship arrangements, as many sponsors have become weary 
of associating themselves with a team or athlete that could result in sport-
ing disgrace.68 Most principal sponsorship arrangements with teams are 
                                                                                                             
 62. The Tour de France draws an estimated ten to fifteen million people to its route 
each year. Colin Bateman, British Are Coming with Genuine Tour de Force in Tour de 
France, EXPRESS (London), July 3, 2010, available at 2010 WLNR 13370710; Jeremy 
Whittle, Mark Cavendish Rips Up Tour Record Books as He Claims Tenth Stage Win, 
TIMES (July 27, 2009), 
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/sport/more_sport/cycling/article6728238.ece (Eng.). 
 63. Michel Desbordes, The Economics of Cycling, in HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS 
OF SPORT 398, 409 (Wladimir Androff & Stefan Szymanski eds., 2006). 
 64. UCI Regulations, Part II, supra note 28, ch. XV, § 4, art. 2.15.050, at 90. 
 65. Tour Team History Part 2, supra note 56; The World’s Best Cycling Team Cele-
brates 10-Year Anniversary, RIIS CYCLING (Aug. 27, 2011, 7:55 PM), http://www.riis-
cycling.com/ny_news.asp?n_id=1495&lang=uk. 
 66. See Brecht Decaluwé, Riis Announces Two New Sponsors for Future, 
CYCLINGNEWS (July 12, 2010, 10:37 PM), http://www.cyclingnews.com/news/riis-
announces-two-new-sponsors-for-future. 
 67. The team’s success culminated in 2008 when team member Carlos Sastre won the 
Tour de France and the team won the team classification. See Sastre, CSC-Saxo Bank 
Deliver Tour de France Win for New Bell Volt, EASTERN-BELL SPORTS, 
http://www.eastonbellsports.com/sastre-csc-saxo-bank-deliver-tour-de-france-win-for-
new-bell-volt (last visited Sept. 27, 2011). 
 68. See Jim Vertuno, Discovery Team Disbands: Elite American Cycling Unit Unable 
to Secure New Sponsor, FT. WAYNE J. GAZETTE, Aug. 11, 2007, at 6B, available at 2007 
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for only one or two years as a result.69 Continuing the Riis Cycling ex-
ample, after a six-year period in which CSC was the sole principal spon-
sor of Riis Cycling, the Danish bank Saxo Bank joined as another princi-
pal sponsor in 2008 and was the sole principal sponsor in 2009 and 
2010.70 UCI Regulations permit teams to have a maximum of two princi-
pal sponsors.71 Saxo Bank was prepared to leave the cycling sponsorship 
market following the expiration of its 2010 contract, but was convinced 
to come back in as a co-principal partner along with the American soft-
ware company SunGard when Riis was able to secure Contador as a rid-
er.72 
As a result of unstable sponsorship issues and the resulting financial 
difficulties, the UCI imposes a number of regulations meant to help pro-
vide stability to the sport. First, the team must have a “paying agent” 
who is the person or entity responsible for the team’s financial, contrac-
tual and legal obligations, such as rider and sponsorship contracts.73 The 
paying agent can only act through the physical persons who hold a UCI 
license.74 For Team Saxo Bank-SunGard, most likely Riis Cycling is the 
paying agent, acting through Bjarne Riis, who holds a UCI license. Se-
cond, a team’s ProTour license is generally granted for a four-year peri-
od.75 However, each team must register each year anew pursuant to the 
criteria described earlier.76 Third, the paying agent is required to provide 
key financial documents to the UCI, including account statements, profit 
and loss statements, cash flow plans, and budgets.77 Fourth, each team 
                                                                                                             
WLNR 15678617 (discussing the disbanding of the Discovery team, on which Lance 
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Mobile to End Sponsorship, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 2007, at D1, available at 2007 WLNR 
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 69. Interview with John Wilcockson, Editor, VeloNews.com (Aug. 16, 2010) (Wil-
cockson has covered over forty Tours de France for a variety of publications and has 
written seven books on the sport of cycling); see, e.g., Doreen Carvajal, After Scandal, 
Cycling Struggles for Sponsors, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 2007, at C.5. 
 70. History, RIIS CYCLING, http://www.riis-
cycling.com/pages.asp?pa_id=5&top_menu=2&under_menu=1 (last visited Sept. 27, 
2011). 
 71. UCI Regulations, Part II, supra note 28, ch. XV, § 4, art. 2.15.055, at 91. 
 72. Moore, Tour Champion Contador to Replace Schleck at Saxo Bank, GUARDIAN, 
supra note 4.  
 73. UCI Regulations, Part II, supra note 28, ch. XV, § 4, arts. 2.15.057–63, at 91–92. 
 74. Id. ch. XV, § 4, art. 2.15.060, at 92. 
 75. Id. ch. XV, § 3, art. 2.15.031, at 86–87. 
 76. See supra text accompanying notes 40–52. 
 77. UCI Regulations, Part II, supra note 28, ch. XV, § 4, art. 2.15.068, at 94. 
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must obtain a bank guarantee for the team’s debts, including its con-
tracts.78 
The UCI Regulations are demonstrative that “[t]he financial stability of 
the UCI ProTeam must be ensured at all times, in particular by adequate 
owner’s equity.”79 For example, the Regulations state that all “income 
deriv[ed] from the . . . [team] must be allocated exclusively [for the] op-
erations of the team.80 
A typical budget for a ProTeam is between $10 and $20 million.81 
However, in 2010, in its first season of racing, Britain’s Team Sky was 
believed to have a budget in excess of $50 million.82 It was revealed in 
2011 that the United States Postal Service paid approximately $8 million 
per year to finance Lance Armstrong’s teams between 2001 and 2004.83 
The $8 million represented approximately 60–65% of the team’s budg-
et.84 
The financial requirements are essential to ensuring that each ProTeam 
is professionally staffed and maintained. Each UCI ProTeam must have 
“at least [twenty-three] riders, [two] team managers and [eight] other 
staff . . . on a full-time basis.”85 The maximum number of riders depends 
on the number of “new professionals” a team has, up to a maximum of 
thirty total riders.86 A new professional is simply a rider in his first year 
as a professional. 
ii. Professional Continental Teams 
A Professional Continental team is substantially the same as a ProTour 
team in its organization, licensing, registration, organization, UCI obliga-
tions, funding, and more. One key difference is that in its licensing and 
registration process, a Continental team is not judged on a sporting crite-
ria.87 “Each . . . continental team must employ at least [sixteen] riders, 
                                                                                                             
 78. Id. ch. XV, § 4, arts. 2.15.092–96, at 99. 
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on Tour, ADVERTISER (Austl.), Jan. 22, 2010, at 12. 
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 85. UCI Regulations, Part II, supra note 28, ch. XV, § 4, art. 2.15.049, at 89–90. 
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[two] team managers, and [three] other staff . . . on a full-time basis.”88 A 
Continental team can have a maximum of twenty-five riders.89 
A Continental team may aspire to become a ProTour team, and the 
Continental team status functions as an important stepping stone in the 
process. Cycling’s Grand Tours (the Tour de France, Giro d’Italia, and 
Vuelta a España) typically have between twenty and twenty-two teams 
each year—more than the eighteen teams licensed as ProTour teams each 
year by the UCI.90 Consequently, each year two to four Continental 
teams have the opportunity to participate in cycling’s biggest events and 
make headlines. The Continental team can then apply for the next season 
for a ProTour license based on its performance in the prior season.91 
This two-tiered system operates similarly to the promotion and relega-
tion system used in European sports, most notably soccer. In promotion 
and relegation, a sports league is divided into several divisions, with the 
highest division composed of the best caliber of teams and players.92 At 
the end of each season, each division in the league will relegate or de-
mote the bottom two or three teams from that division to the next lowest 
division. In their place, the top two or three teams from that next lowest 
division will be promoted to the higher division. The demoted teams may 
be given some financial support while the promoted teams may have to 
meet off-the-field conditions to ensure promotion, such as financial sol-
vency, stadium capacity, and facilities.93 
The promotion and relegation system permits teams to start at the very 
bottom of the sporting world and rise to the very top. Although profes-
sional cycling only has two “divisions” as compared to English soccer’s 
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five,94 the system still reduces the barriers to and costs of entry for pro-
fessional cycling teams. 
iii. Association Internationale des Groupes Cyclistes Professionnels  
All teams, whether ProTour and Continental, registered with the UCI 
collectively form the International Association of Professional Cycling 
groups, or Association Internationale des Groupes Cyclistes Profession-
nels (“AIGCP”) in French. The AIGCP has very little power in the struc-
ture of professional cycling. While the AIGCP and the riders’ union, Cy-
clistes Professionnels Associes (“CPA”), do negotiate Joint Agreements 
governing certain aspects of the riders employment, the agreements are 
very basic and do not substantially impact the sport, as will be discussed 
in further detail later. In addition, the AIGCP and its member teams do 
not host any events from which to draw revenue. 
Teams registered as ProTour teams formed the International Profes-
sional Cycling Teams (“IPCT”) following the formation of the ProTour 
in 2005, as will be discussed in more detail below. The IPCT supple-
ments the larger AIGCP but, like the AIGCP, only serves an advisory 
role in the business of professional cycling.95 
C. Cyclists 
A cyclist who wishes to become a professional must obtain a UCI li-
cense from the national federation where he or she resides.96 Each na-
tional federation can determine the criteria for issuing a license.97 The 
only criteria set by USA Cycling, the American national federation, is 
the completion of an application, that the cyclist be at least nineteen 
years old, and payment of $60.98 
A rider is free to sign a contract with any team registered with the UCI 
once he obtains his UCI license. A rider will have reached such a level 
                                                                                                             
 94. For a current listing of the teams in each of the five levels, see SOCCER ASS’N, 
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by entering and doing well in races sanctioned by his national federation 
as an individual beforehand. A contract of employment with either a UCI 
ProTeam or a Continental team is governed by the standard cycling con-
tract under UCI Regulations and the Joint Agreements as negotiated by 
AIGCP and the CPA.99 
i. Cyclistes Professionnels Associes and the Joint Agreements 
The CPA is effectively the labor union for professional road cyclists 
but either lacks or has substantially failed to act upon any of its potential 
power under European law.100 The CPA, like the AIGCP, has little influ-
ence on the direction and structure of professional cycling. With few em-
ployees and resources, the CPA is relegated to an advisory role.101 
A cyclist contract must be for a fixed period of years, beginning and 
ending on December 31.102 For the 2010 season, the minimum salary for 
a ProTour rider was €33,000 (about $42,500 as of March 2011).103 The 
minimum for a Continental rider was €27,500 (approximately 
$35,500).104 These amounts do not include any bonuses, compensation, 
prizes, or other benefits awarded from races.105 In the past, teams have 
had difficulty making payroll,106 and as a result, if a team fails to pay a 
rider on time, the rider’s payment is automatically increased at an annual 
interest rate of 5%.107 
The Joint Agreements ensure that teams provide disability and insur-
ance benefits to the riders in addition the rider’s salary. A rider injured 
                                                                                                             
 99. UCI Regulations, Part II, supra note 28, ch. XV, § 4, art. 2.15.111, at 104. The 
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 100. See, e.g., Desbordes, supra note 63, at 403, 409 (explaining that cycling teams are 
financed solely by sponsors who often become insolvent and leave the team’s riders un-
employed). 
 101. Interview with John Wilcockson, supra note 69; see, e.g., Greg Johnson & Paul 
Verkuylen, CPA, UCI to Increase Communication, CYCLINGNEWS (Mar. 26, 2008), 
http://www.cyclingnews.com/news/cpa-uci-to-increase-communication. 
 102. UCI Regulations, Part II, supra note 28, ch. XV, § 4, art. 2.15.139, at 111. 
 103. UCI, Joint Agreements, ch. II, art. 10, at 172–73 (Sept. 30, 2010), available at 
http://www.uci.ch (follow “Rules” hyperlink; then follow “Joint Agreements” hyperlink) 
[hereinafter UCI Regulations, Joint Agreements]. 
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during the course of his employment is entitled to his full salary for three 
months and 50% of his salary for another three months, so long as the 
amount being paid is not less than the minimum annual salaries dis-
cussed earlier.108 To be eligible for the benefits, “industrial disablement” 
must be established.109 This European standard examines the level of dis-
ablement “by reference to a person of the same age and sex whose physi-
cal and mental condition is normal.”110 Obtaining industrial disablement 
benefits “normally requires a disablement assessment of at least 
[14%].”111 How this compares with disability insurance in American 
sports will be discussed later in the Article. 
In addition, where a rider is not already covered under a national health 
insurance and/or pension program, the team is required to take out poli-
cies to cover the rider.112 Most European riders—as opposed to American 
riders—are covered by some type of national health insurance.113 Conse-
quently, this provision potentially makes American riders more expen-
sive to a team than comparable European riders because the team has to 
contribute to a health insurance plan for the American rider. 
ii. Free Agency and the Bosman Ruling 
Perhaps the most important part of the cyclist’s contract is the set of 
terms governing his future employment. In American sports, we are fa-
miliar with the concept of free agency, e.g., when a player has accrued a 
certain amount of experience114 as determined by a collective bargaining 
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 109. Id. 
 110. Nicholas J. Wikeley, Social Security Appeals in Great Britain, 46 ADMIN. L. REV. 
183, 189 (1994). 
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 112. UCI Regulations, Joint Agreements, supra note 103, ch. II, art. 22, at 176. 
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least six years of Major League Service to be a free agent); Nat’l Basketball Ass’n & 
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ketball Association, a player must have at least four seasons to be an Unrestricted Free 
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agreement (“CBA”) between his union and the teams, and his contract 
has expired, he may offer his services to any and all bidders for a salary 
limited only by the terms of the CBA.115 
While free agency rights in American sports were mostly developed in 
the 1970s,116 the rights of European athletes were not conclusively estab-
lished until the Bosman ruling in 1995.117 Jean-Marc Bosman was a soc-
cer player on the Belgian club RC Liege whose contract expired at the 
end of June 1990.118 In April 1990, RC Liege offered Bosman a contract 
worth a quarter of what he made the previous year, which he rejected.119 
As a result of his rejection, Bosman was placed on the “compulsory” 
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 116. See Chris Deubert & Glenn M. Wong, Understanding the Evolution of Signing 
Bonuses and Guaranteed Money in the National Football League: Preparing for the 
2011 Collective Bargaining Negotiations, 16 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 179, 183–90 (2009) 
(describing the leading cases that led to free agency in the respective sports: in the NFL, 
Mackey v. Nat’l Football League, 407 F. Supp. 1000 (D. Minn. 1975), aff’d in relevant 
part, 543 F.2d 610 (8th Cir. 1976); in the NHL, Phila. World Hockey Club, Inc. v. Phila. 
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Mo. 1976), aff’d, 532 F.2d 615 (8th Cir. 1976)). 
 117. Case C-415/93, Union Royale Belge des Societes de Football Ass’n v. Bosman, 
1995 E.C.R. I-04921 [hereinafter Bosman]; see generally Andrew L. Lee, The Bosman 
Case: Protecting Freedom of Movement in European Football, 19 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 
1255 (1996); Amikam Omer Kranz, The Bosman Case: The Relationship between Euro-
pean Union Law and the Transfer System in European Football, 5 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 431 
(1999). 
 118. Bosman, 1995 E.C.R. I-04921, ¶ 28. 
 119. Id. ¶ 29. 
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transfer list, which allowed RC Liege to shop Bosman’s rights to any 
interested team in return for a compensation fee meant to cover the costs 
of training the player.120 When RC Liege and US Dunkerque, a French 
team, were unable to come to a suitable agreement, RC Liege chose to 
suspend Bosman for the entire season.121 
Bosman challenged the league’s transfer rules as an illegal obstacle to 
the free movement of workers under European Community (“EC”) 
law.122 After a protracted legal battle, the European Court of Justice, the 
highest court in the EC in matters of EC law, ruled that “freedom of 
movement for workers . . . is a fundamental freedom” in the EC and that 
private associations cannot adopt sporting rules which restrict the exer-
cise of rights conferred on individuals by EC law.123 
The result of the Bosman decision was that athletes in EC states could 
now offer their services to any team upon the expiration of their contract 
without their prior team having any say in the matter or receiving any 
type of compensation. Nevertheless, a lucrative transfer system remains 
whereby teams can loan or outright transfer a player still under contract 
to another team for large sums of money.124 
UCI Regulations specifically state that at the expiration of a rider’s 
contract, “the [r]ider shall be entirely free to leave the [team] and sign a 
contract with a third party”125 and “[a]ll transfer payment systems are 
prohibited.”126 However, UCI Regulations permit a transfer period from 
August 1 to December 31, during which UCI ProTeams or license appli-
cants may recruit riders for the following year.127 As a result, as in the 
case of Contador discussed at the beginning of this Article, it is common 
for riders to agree to ride for a new team the following calendar year de-
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 121. Id. ¶ 33. 
 122. Id. ¶ 92. The law most importantly invoked by Bosman was Article 48 of the 
Treaty Establishing the European Community, first signed by Belgium, France, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and West Germany in 1957. Id. This Treaty has been 
amended and added to many times and is part of the law of all nations of the European 
Union. See generally Ingolf Pernice, The Treaty of Lisbon: Multilevel Constitutionalism 
in Action, 15 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 349 (2009) (detailing the development of European Union 
law). 
 123. Bosman, 1995 E.C.R. I-04921, Summary ¶¶ 7, 8, 9, 12. 
 124. See GLENN M. WONG, ESSENTIALS OF SPORTS LAW § 10.4, at 502–04 (4th ed. 
2010) (describing the Bosman case and stating that in 2009, the Spanish soccer club, Real 
Madrid, set a record when it paid ninety-three million euros (about $131 million at the 
time) to obtain forward Cristiano Ronaldo from Manchester United). 
 125. UCI Regulations, Part II, supra note 28, ch. XV, § 4, art. 2.15.139, at 113 (quot-
ing Article 7 of the “Standard contract between a rider and a UCI Proteam”). 
 126. Id. ch. XV, § 4, art. 2.15.120, at 106. 
 127. See id. ch. XV, § 4, arts. 2.15.120–20b, at 106–07. 
2011] AMERICAN STRUCTURE FOR PRO CYCLING 83 
spite four months remaining on their current contract. The Vuelta a Es-
paña, one of cycling’s Grand Tours, is unfortunately held during this 
“lame duck” period. 
A team may not negotiate with a rider under contract except during the 
transfer period.128 Teams and riders that violate this rule are subject to 
fines of 5,000 (about $4,700) and 2,000 (about $1,900) Swiss francs, re-
spectively.129 
Finally, there is one particularly interesting provision concerning the 
employment of cyclists—riders and teams have the option to agree to a 
contract whereby the rider is a “self-employed worker.”130 The contract 
between the rider and the team must honor most, but not all, of the provi-
sions of the standard contract.131 The major differences being that the 
rider’s salary must be at least 150% of the minimum salary (almost 
$64,000 for a ProTour rider),132 and riders are required to pay for and 
prove that they have their own health and disability insurance.133 
D. Races and Race Organizers 
A UCI ProTour license, as mentioned earlier, is meant to provide the 
licensed team with the opportunity to enter UCI WorldTour events.134 In 
fact, all UCI ProTour teams are required to participate in all events on 
the UCI WorldTour.135 It is important to point out that most of the events 
on the UCI WorldTour are not organized by the UCI; the events are or-
ganized by other entities that agree to host an event as part of the 
                                                                                                             
 128. Id. ch. XV, § 4, art. 2.15.121a, at 107. 
 129. Id. ch. XV, § 4, art. 2.15.125, at 108. 
 130. Id. ch. XV, § 4, art. 2.15.115 bis, at 104–05. 
 131. Id. ch. XV, § 4, art. 2.15.115 bis(3), at 105. 
 132. Id.; see also UCI Regulations, Joint Agreements, supra note 103, ch. II, art. 10, at 
172–73. 
 133. UCI Regulations, Part II, supra note 28, ch. XV, § 4, art. 2.15.115 bis(4–6), at 
105. 
 134. Id. ch. XV, § 4, art. 2.15.003, at 82. In 2010, there was a sixteen-event UCI Pro-
Tour as well as separate events, including the three Grand Tours (Giro d’Italia, Tour de 
France, and Vuelta a España), which made up a World Calendar. See 2010 UCI ProTour 
Races, UCI WORLDTOUR, http://www.uciprotour.com (follow “Races” hyperlink; then 
follow “Archives” hyperlink; then follow “UCI 2010 ProTour” hyperlink) (last visited 
Oct. 7, 2011); 2010-2011 UCI Road Calendar, UCI, http://www.uci.ch (follow “Road” 
hyperlink; then follow “Calendar” hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 7, 2011). The dual system 
was eliminated prior to the 2011 season and all of the events were merged into one UCI 
WorldTour. John Wilcockson, Confusion Continues as ProTour Teams Will Start All 26 
Races in New UCI World Tour, VELO NEWS (Oct. 5, 2010, 3:30 PM), 
http://velonews.competitor.com/2010/10/news/confusion-continues-as-protour-teams-
will-start-all-26-races-in-new-uci-world-tour_144865. 
 135. Id. ch. XV, § 10, art. 2.15.261, at 131. 
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WorldTour for a variety of reasons, most notably it requires the best 
teams in the world to participate in the event. The UCI ProTour (the pre-
cursor to the current UCI WorldTour) and ProTour licensing schemes 
were created in 2005, replacing the fractured UCI Road World Cup Se-
ries. The new system was meant to address many of the problems dis-
cussed in this Article, including the short-term team sponsorship agree-
ments, the financial viability of teams, and problems with doping. 
A key to the UCI ProTour’s initial success was convincing the three 
organizers of the Grand Tours to include their events as part of the Pro-
Tour. To make clear, the UCI is not involved in the creation, planning, 
financing, or operations of the three most important events in profession-
al cycling. Instead, the Tour de France is organized by the Amaury Sport 
Organisation (“ASO”), the Giro d’Italia is organized by RCS Sport, and 
the Vuelta a España is organized by ASO and Unipublic. Both organiza-
tions organize other cycling as well as sporting events.136 
The ASO and other race organizers realistically have the most power 
in the world of professional cycling. The race organizers own the most 
lucrative asset in professional cycling: the television rights to the Tour de 
France and other major events. The Tour de France is broadcast on ap-
proximately 118 channels in over 185 countries and is worth approxi-
mately $125 million in annual revenue to the ASO.137 
The Grand Tours are keenly aware of their power in the sport. After a 
contentious 2007 ProTour season, the three Grand Tours withdrew from 
the UCI ProTour.138 The Grand Tours did not want to be forced to accept 
all eighteen ProTour teams into their events, instead wanting the freedom 
to invite more Professional Continental teams, which bring a national 
constituency and fan-base.139 The UCI urged all ProTour teams to boy-
cott ASO’s March 2007 Paris-Nice race, claiming it was a forbidden race 
                                                                                                             
 136. The Amaury Sport Organisation, based in France, also organizes Paris-Nice, Par-
is-Roubaix, Liege-Bastogne-Liege, the Paris Marathon, and the French Open in golf. For 
more information see AMAURY SPORT ORG., http://www.aso.fr/us/homepage.html (last 
visited Sept. 16, 2011). RCS Sport, part of RCS Mediagroup based in Italy, also organiz-
es Milan-San Remo and the Milan Marathon. For more information see RCS MEDIA 
GROUP, http://www.rcsmediagroup.it/wps/portal/mg/ (last visited Sept. 16, 2011). 
 137. Kasey Coholan, The Tour de France: Paris, CAN. BUS., 
http://www.canadianbusiness.com/article/16823—the-tour-de-france-paris (last visited 
Sept. 17, 2011). 
 138. John Henderson, Cycling Feud Requires Vaughter to Ride to Rescue of Sport, 
DENVER POST, Apr. 19, 2009, at C5. 
 139. Val Migliaccio, Peace Deal Ends Trauma for Tour, ADVERTISER (Austl.), Aug. 
19, 2008, at 87; see also UCI Versus Grand Tour Organisers: The Gloves Are Off, 
CYCLINGNEWS.COM (Dec. 10, 2005), 
http://autobus.cyclingnews.com/features/?id=2005/pro_tour_disarray. 
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under UCI Regulations.140 In response, ASO threatened to ban any rider 
who boycotted Paris-Nice from participating in the Tour de France.141 
Although neither the boycott nor the ban was carried out, during the 
2008 Tour de France, seventeen of the eighteen ProTour teams142 partici-
pating threatened not to apply for ProTour licenses the following year, 
which would have crippled the ProTour arrangement.143 
A crisis was averted in September 2008 when ASO and the UCI 
reached a compromise that brought the Grand Tours back onto an ex-
panded World Calendar, including many ASO events.144 Nevertheless, 
the UCI still lacks control over the sport’s biggest events and organizers. 
Instead, the UCI’s only meaningful recourse is the power it has over the 
teams, who need a UCI license and ProTeam registration approved each 
year. Consequently, the UCI directs that race organizers must follow UCI 
rules or the UCI will punish any UCI licensed team that participates in 
the non-sanctioned race. This imbalance of power has been the source of 
much of professional cycling’s tension and acrimony.145 
Race organizers must also obtain a UCI license to host their events,146 
and then apply each year to their respective national federations to have 
their races included on the racing calendars.147 In addition, as stated ear-
lier, their races must comply with the UCI’s extensive regulations on the 
organization and structure of the race, for example the duration of the 
race,148 stage distances,149 total distance of the race,150 the number of rest 
days,151 and the awarding of bonus points during the race.152 
                                                                                                             
 140. See Henderson, supra note 138; UCI Regulations, Part I, supra note 29, ch. II, art. 
1.2.019, at 23 (stating that “[n]o license holder may participate in an event that has not 
been included on a national, continental or world calendar or that has not been recognised 
by a national federation, a continental federation or the UCI.”). 
 141. Henderson, supra note 138, at C5. 
 142. Team Astana, which featured 2007 Tour de France champion Alberto Contador, 
was not invited to participate in the 2008 Tour because of doping allegations. See Dan 
Harbles, ProTour Teams Take Sides, DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), Jul. 16, 2008, at 13. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Henderson, supra note 138, at C5. 
 145. See, e.g., Assoc. Press, Cycling Teams Threaten Boycott Over Radio Feud, N.Y. 
TIMES (Mar. 17, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/18/sports/cycling/CYCUCIRadioFeud-2.html?_r=1; 
Padraig, To Snub or Snipe?, RED KITE PRAYER (Sept. 18, 2010), 
http://redkiteprayer.com/?p=3522. 
 146. UCI Regulations, Part I, supra note 29, ch. I, § 1, art. 1.1.010(1.6), at 3. 
 147. UCI Regulations, Part I, supra note 29, ch. II, § 1, art. 1.2.006, at 21. 
 148. Major tours must be between fifteen and twenty-three days. UCI Regulations, 
Part II, supra note 28, ch. VI, art. 2.6.007, at 41. 
 149. The maximum length of a stage is 240 kilometers (148.8 miles). The maximum 
average daily distance (not including the prologue) is 180 kilometers (111.6 miles). The 
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II. COMPARISON TO AMERICAN SPORTS LEAGUE STRUCTURES 
The first part of this Article examined the structure of professional cy-
cling. The second part of the Article will compare that structure to the 
structure of America’s four largest, most important, and most successful 
professional sports leagues—the National Football League (“NFL”), Ma-
jor League Baseball (“MLB”), the National Basketball Association 
(“NBA”), and the National Hockey League (“NHL”)—collectively 
known as the “Big Four”. 
In reality, the UCI is most similar to the Professional Golf Association 
(“PGA”). The PGA is an organization comprised of approximately 
28,000 individual golfers who are certified by the PGA and participate in 
PGA events according to PGA rules.153 In addition, the PGA organizes 
the PGA Tour—a schedule of events for the elite players in the world. 
Based on the golfers’ performance in these events, they are awarded 
ranking points similar to the UCI.154 Also like the UCI, the PGA does not 
organize every event on the golfing calendar that is calculated into these 
rankings. Specifically, the PGA does not host three of golf’s major tour-
naments: the Masters,155 the U.S. Open,156 and the Open Champion-
ship.157 The key difference between the UCI and the PGA is that there is 
no team structure whatsoever in professional golf. 
                                                                                                             
maximum distance for an individual time trial is 60 kilometers (37.2 miles). Id. ch. VI, 
art. 2.6.008, at 42. 
 150. The maximum length of a major tour is 3,500 kilometers (2,170 miles). Id. ch. VI, 
art. 2.6.011, at 43. 
 151. In major tours there must be at least two rest days. Id. ch. VI, art. 2.6.012, at 43. 
 152. Id. ch. VI, art. 2.6.019, at 45–46. 
 153. See History, PGA OF AMERICA, http://www.pga.com/pga-america/history (last 
visited Oct. 5, 2011). 
 154. For more on the World Golf Ranking system, see How the System Works, 
OFFICIAL WORLD GOLF RANKING, (Jan. 1, 2011), 
http://www.officialworldgolfranking.com/about_us/default.sps?iType=425. 
 155. The Masters Tournament is hosted each year by the Augusta National Golf Club 
in Augusta, Georgia. It is the only one of golf’s four majors that does not change venues. 
For more information, see About the Masters, MASTERS, 
http://www.masters.com/en_US/discover/about.html (last visited Oct. 5, 2011). 
 156. The U.S. Open is held by the United States Golf Association (“USGA”). About 
USGA, U.S. GOLF ASS’N, http://www.usga.org/about.aspx?id=7881#show=d1615101-
00df-42fe-97f1-bb9cd1de416c (last visited Oct. 7, 2011). Whereas the PGA is an associa-
tion of golfers, the USGA is national association of golf courses, clubs, and facilities, and 
the governing body of golf for the Untied States and Mexico. See id. Together with the 
R&A, the USGA produces and interprets the Rules of Golf. Id. 
 157. The Open Championship, also known as the British Open, is organized by the 
R&A, golf’s governing authority in Europe, formerly part of the Royal & Ancient Golf 
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The introduction of the team element is what makes comparing profes-
sional cycling to the Big Four worthwhile. These leagues are substantial-
ly similar in their structure and operations. Consequently, this Article 
focuses on the structure of the NFL whose popularity158 and litigation-
filled history make it an interesting case study. Notably, the NFL and its 
players reached a new CBA in July 2011 following a contentious labor 
dispute. The CBA ultimately reached between the NFL and the players is 
believed to be substantially similar to the one that existed from 1993 
through March 2011 in cycling, which will provide much of the back-
ground for a useful comparison. 
A. The National Football League  
The NFL is an unincorporated association of thirty-two separately 
owned and operated football teams.159 An association, by definition, is an 
unincorporated organization that is not a legal entity separate from the 
persons composing the organization.160 The structure of the NFL and its 
related entities is an oft-litigated topic, most recently before the United 
States Supreme Court in American Needle, Inc. v. National Football 
League.161 The league operates according to its Bylaws and Constitution, 
which are agreed upon by the thirty-two member teams. Section 1 of the 
Sherman Act, the United States’ antitrust law, outlaws any contract, 
                                                                                                             
Club at St. Andrews in Scotland. For more information, About the R&A, R&A, 
http://www.randa.org/en/RandA.aspx (last visited Oct. 7, 2011). 
 158. See Super Bowl XLIV Mashes M-A-S-H: Saints Victory over Colts Most-Watched 
Program in TV History, CHARLESTON DAILY MAIL (W.Va.), Feb. 9, 2010, at B4 (describ-
ing how the 2010 Super Bowl was the most watched program in U.S. television history). 
 159. Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 538 F.3d 736, 737 (7th Cir. 2008), 
rev’d, Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 130 S.Ct. 2201 (2010). American Nee-
dle, a hat manufacturer and licensee of NFL trademarks, sued the NFL and its related 
entity, NFL Properties (“NFLP”), after NFLP agreed to an exclusive license with Reebok 
for the licensing of intellectual property to use on clothing and related merchandise. Id. at 
738. Both the district court and Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals granted the NFL sum-
mary judgment, ruling that through NFLP, the thirty-two NFL teams were a single-entity 
and therefore incapable of violating antitrust law under Copperweld Corp. v. Independ-
ence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 738–39 (1984). The Supreme Court reversed, ruling that 
NFLP was merely an “instrumentality” of the teams and that competitors cannot avoid 
antitrust liability by acting through a third-party intermediary or joint venture. Am. Nee-
dle, Inc., 130 S.Ct. at 2215. In addition, the court stated that the “teams are acting as sep-
arate economic actors pursuing separate economic interests and each team therefore is a 
potential independent center of decisionmaking.” Id. at 2213. 
 160. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 141 (9th ed. 2009). 
 161. Am. Needle, Inc., 130 S.Ct. at 2204. 
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combination, or conspiracy which unreasonably restrains trade.162 Con-
sequently, the Bylaws and Constitution, among other agreements involv-
ing the separate teams, have been the basis for many antitrust lawsuits, 
including the issues of team ownership,163 team relocation,164 intellectual 
property licensing,165 television broadcasts,166 player salaries,167 player 
movement,168 and more.169 
                                                                                                             
 162. See Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2004); see also Standard Oil Co. of 
New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 87 (1911) (ruling that only “unreasonable” re-
straints are illegal). 
 163. See N. Am. Soccer League v. Nat’l Football League, 670 F.2d 1249 (2d Cir. 
1982) (ruling that the NFL could not enforce a policy prohibiting owners from owning 
sports teams in other leagues); see also Sullivan v. Nat’l Football League, 34 F.3d 1091 
(1st Cir. 1994) (ruling that the NFL’s ban against corporate ownership could unreasona-
bly restrain trade. The case was settled prior to a jury determination on remand). 
 164. See L.A. Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n v. Nat’l Football League, 726 F.2d 1381 (9th 
Cir. 1984) (ruling that the NFL’s procedures on franchise relocation were not sufficiently 
narrowly tailored in compliance with antitrust law). 
 165. See Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 130 S.Ct. 2201, 2212–13 (2010) 
(holding that for purposes of licensing their intellectual property, the thirty-two NFL 
teams could not be considered a single-entity). 
 166. See United States v. Nat’l Football League, 116 F. Supp. 319, 327 (D. Pa. 1953) 
(holding that the NFL’s rule prohibiting the televising of outside games into a team’s 
home territory when that team is playing an away game to be an “unreasonable and ille-
gal restraint of trade”); see also United States v. Nat’l Football League, 196 F. Supp. 445, 
447 (D. Pa. 1961) (ruling that the decision of the NFL’s fourteen member clubs to collec-
tively sell the broadcast rights to their games also violated antitrust law). These decisions 
were statutorily overruled by the Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1291–
1295 (1961). See also Shaw v. Dallas Cowboys Football Club, Ltd., 172 F.3d 299, 303 
(3d Cir. 1999) (ruling that the NFL’s deal with DirecTV violated antitrust law). 
 167. See Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 251 (1996) (ruling that NFL’s 
decision to impose fixed salaries for practice squad players is exempt from antitrust lia-
bility under the nonstatutory labor exemption). 
 168. Mackey v. Nat’l Football League, 407 F. Supp. 1000, 1007 (D. Minn. 1975), aff’d 
in relevant part, 543 F.2d 610 (8th Cir. 1976)(ruling that NFL’s Rozelle Rule was an 
unreasonable restraint on player movement, and therefore constituted a violation of anti-
trust laws); see also White v. Nat’l Football League, 836 F. Supp. 1458 (D. Minn. 1993); 
McNeil v. Nat’l Football League, 790 F. Supp. 871, 896 (D. Minn. 1992) (invalidating 
NFL’s existing free agency restrictions). 
 169. Radovich v. Nat’l Football League, 352 U.S. 445, 451 (1957) (ruling that the 
NFL, unlike MLB, is subject to antitrust laws); see also U.S. Football League v. Nat’l 
Football League, 644 F. Supp. 1040 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), aff’d, 842 F.2d 1335, 1340 (2d Cir. 
1988) (Although a jury found that the NFL unlawfully monopolized professional football 
in the United States, the district court rejected the rest of the USFL’s claims, finding “that 
the NFL had neither monopolized a relevant television submarket nor attempted to do so; 
that the NFL did not commit any overt act in furtherance of a conspiracy to monopolize; 
that the NFL did not engage in a conspiracy in restraint of trade; that the NFL’s television 
contracts were not unreasonable restraints of trade; that the NFL did not control access to 
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The league has many employees, who essentially work for the thirty-
two teams, to handle the business operations of the league, most notably 
the Commissioner. The Commissioner is hired by the teams and the 
scope of his power is generally only limited by the terms of the CBA 
reached with the players’ union.170 Current NFL Commissioner Roger 
Goodell arguably has more power than his fellow Commissioners in 
MLB, the NBA, or the NHL. In particular, he has been aggressive in en-
forcing a personal conduct policy.171 
The league serves many important functions for its member teams, in-
cluding negotiating the CBA with the players’ union (including the drug 
testing policy),172 negotiating television contracts,173 providing uniform 
rules and regulations for both on-the-field and off-the-field matters,174 
                                                                                                             
the three major television networks; and that the NFL did not interfere either with the 
USFL’s ability to obtain a fall television contract or with its spring television contracts.” 
As a result, the jury awarded a total of $1 in damages, affirmed on appeal, effectively 
ending any chance of the USFL’s resurrection and competition with the NFL.). 
 170. For cases involving the scope of Commissioner authority, see Rose v. Giamatti, 
721 F. Supp. 906, 919 (D. Ohio 1989) (upholding the power of MLB Commissioner Bart 
Giamatti to discipline Pete Rose); see also Finley v. Kuhn, 569 F.2d 527, 534 (7th Cir. 
1978); Milwaukee Am. Ass’n v. Landis, 49 F.2d 298, 301 (D. Ill. 1931); Am. League 
Baseball Club of New York v. Johnson, 179 N.Y.S. 498, 503 (Sup. Ct. 1919), aff’d, 190 
A.D. 932, 179 N.Y.S. 898 (1920). 
 171. The following players have all been given suspensions ranging from six games to 
a full season or more for various types of illegal and inappropriate conduct: Michael 
Vick, Adam “Pacman” Jones, Plaxico Burress, Donte Stallworth, Chris Henry, Tank 
Johnson, and Ben Roethlisberger. See D. Orlando Ledbetter, QB Penalty ‘Unprecedent-
ed’, ATL. J. CONST., Apr. 22, 2010, at 1C; see also Matthew J. Parlow, Professional 
Sports League Commissioners’ Authority and Collective Bargaining, 11 TEX. REV. ENT. 
& SPORTS L. 179, 187 (2010). 
 172. NFL CBA, supra note 114, art. XLIV, § 5, at 197–98; see also Nat’l Football 
League, Policy on Anabolic Steroids and Related Substances, NFL PLAYERS ASS’N 
(2010), https://www.nflplayers.com/about-us/Rules—Regulations/Player-
Policies/Steroid-Policy (follow “Steroid Policy Documentation” hyperlink). The NFL’s 
“Policy on Anabolic Steroids and Related Substances” as negotiated with the NFLPA is 
separate from the NFL CBA. See id. 
 173. The thirty-two NFL teams are permitted to sell the rights to their games collec-
tively under the Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1291–1295 (1961). In 
2010, the NFL and its member clubs will receive approximately $3.7 billion in television 
rights deals from CBS, FOX, NBC, ESPN, and DirecTV. WONG, supra note 124, § 
14.2.2, exhibit 14.1, at 719. 
 174. The NFL has a Competition Committee consisting of coaches, owners, and team 
executives to consider on-the-field rule changes. See, e.g., Gerry Fraley, NFL Owners 
Decide Not to Change Overtime Format for Regular-Season Games, DALLAS MORNING 
NEWS (May 26, 2010), http://www.dallasnews.com/sports/dallas-
cowboys/headlines/20100525-NFL-owners-decide-not-to-change-8041.ece. An example 
of a recently changed on-the-field rule is that beginning with the 2010 season, in playoff 
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enforcing the league rules with respect to teams and players,175 and creat-
ing a playing schedule. 
By comparison, the UCI performs many of these same functions for 
the business of cycling. The key difference being the structure—whereas 
the NFL is formed by and through its 32 member teams, the UCI consists 
of about 170 member national federations and the teams have little con-
trol over the rules, regulations, and operation of professional cycling. In 
the NFL, the teams, via the league structure, organize and put on the 
roughly 330 NFL games each season.176 In contrast, ProTour teams are 
merely participants in cycling events being put on by either the UCI or 
an event organizer such as ASO. 
B. Teams 
While UCI-licensed cycling teams have the AIGCP as their collective 
representative, albeit a weak one, the thirty-two NFL teams have the 
NFL as their collective association. Whereas almost anyone with the fi-
nancial resources could put together a cycling team and apply for a UCI 
license, entry into the NFL is much more difficult. The existing NFL 
clubs must approve any application for a new member franchise and 
have the legal right to exclude any owner or organization.177 The most 
                                                                                                             
games only, if a team kicks a field goal on the first possession of overtime, the opposing 
team will have a possession to tie or win the game. Id. Previously it was a sudden death 
rule where the first team to score won. Id. An example of an important off-the-field rule 
is the Rooney Rule. See, e.g., N. Jeremi Duru, The Fritz Pollard Alliance, the Rooney 
Rule, and the Quest to “Level the Playing Field” in the National Football League, 7 VA. 
SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 179, 187–96 (2008). The Rooney Rule requires NFL teams to always 
interview at least one minority candidate for a head coaching or general manager vacan-
cy. Id. at 189. 
 175. In recent years NFL Commissioner Roger Goodell has enforced a very strict per-
sonal conduct policy for all league personnel. See, e.g., Ledbetter, supra note 171; Carlos 
Monarrez, NFL Suspends Lewand for 30 Days, Fines Him, DETROIT FREE PRESS, July 31, 
2010, at B1. Several players have been given suspensions for various types of illegal and 
inappropriate conduct. See supra note 171 and accompanying text. Team personnel are 
also subject to the policy: in 2010, Detroit Lions President Tom Lewand was suspended 
for thirty days and fined $100,000 after being arrested on suspicion of drunk driving. 
Monarrez, supra. 
 176. Each of the 32 teams plays 16 regular season games and approximately 4 presea-
son games. Each game has 2 participating teams, equaling 320 games. In addition, there 
are 11 playoff games. See Schedules, NFL, http://www.nfl.com/schedules (last visited 
Oct. 7, 2011). 
 177. See Mid-S. Grizzlies v. Nat’l Football League, 550 F. Supp. 558 (E.D. Pa. 1982) 
aff’d, 720 F.2d 772 (3d Cir. 1983). The Memphis Grizzlies, a member club of the defunct 
World Football League, sued the NFL for inclusion into the NFL on antitrust grounds. Id. 
at 562. The court granted summary judgment for the NFL, finding that there was no 
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recent entry into the NFL was the Houston Texans in 2002, founded and 
owned by energy billionaire Bob McNair, who paid the existing thirty-
one NFL owners a $700 million expansion fee.178 
Although MLB, the NBA, and the NHL allow it, the NFL prohibits 
corporate ownership of teams.179 Consequently, each NFL team is major-
ity-owned by a particularly wealthy individual, seeing as how NFL fran-
chises are worth an estimated average of over $1 billion.180 Owners typi-
cally create some type of limited liability entity that actually owns the 
team, the names of which are often only revealed during litigation.181 In 
stark contrast, the value of a ProTeam is derived almost entirely from its 
sponsorship agreements that are generally in the range of $10 to $20 mil-
lion.182 
One of the keys to the NFL’s success has been its generous revenue 
sharing arrangements. In 1961, then NFL Commissioner Pete Rozelle 
was instrumental in the passage of the federal government’s Sports 
Broadcasting Act. The Sports Broadcasting Act immunizes the Big Four 
professional leagues and their member teams from antitrust scrutiny in 
the collective selling of the television rights to their games.183 With the 
                                                                                                             
showing how competition in any arguably relevant market would be improved if plain-
tiffs were given a share of the NFL’s monopoly power. Id. at 572. 
 178. See Richard Sandomir, N.F.L. Goes Back to Houston for $700 Million, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 7, 1999, at D5. 
 179. Ryan Schaffer, A Piece of the Rock (or the Rockets): The Viability of Widespread 
Public Offerings of Professional Sports Franchises, 5 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 201, 209 
(2006); see Sullivan v. Nat’l Football League, 34 F.3d 1091 (1st Cir. 1994) (ruling that 
the NFL’s ban against corporate ownership could unreasonably restrain trade. The case 
was settled prior to a jury determination on remand and the policy remains in effect.). 
 180. Special Report: NFL Team Valuations, FORBES, 
http://www.forbes.com/lists/2010/30/football-valuations-10_NFL-Team-
Valuations_Rank.html (last visited Sept. 17, 2011). 
 181. See Jorge E. Leal Garrett & Bryan A. Green, Considerations for Professional 
Sports Teams Contemplating Going Public, 31 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 69, 71, 81, 88–93 
(2010). 
 182. Desbordes, supra note 63, at 403. In addition to the NFL’s no corporate owner-
ship policy, the NFL also prohibits any team or team owner from having any interest in a 
gambling operation. See Ed Bouchette, Ownership Deal Closes With 10 New Partners; 
Rooneys Close Ownership Deal Rooneys Now Meet League Guidelines, PITTSBURGH 
POST-GAZETTE, Sep. 25, 2009, at D1. 
 183. Sports Broadcasting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1291–1295 (1961). 
The antitrust laws . . . shall not apply to any joint agreement by or among per-
sons engaging in or conducting the organized professional team sports of foot-
ball, baseball, basketball, or hockey, by which any league of clubs participating 
in professional football, baseball, basketball, or hockey contests sells or other-
wise transfers all or any part of the rights of such league’s member clubs in the 
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increasing importance of television and television revenues, Rozelle felt 
that the only way small market clubs such as the Green Bay Packers 
could compete with large clubs such as the New York Giants was if all 
teams shared in the television revenues equally. As a result, NFL televi-
sion rights are a tremendously valuable asset and make up nearly half of 
the NFL’s more than $8 billion in annual revenue.184 In professional cy-
cling, because the teams do not put on the events, they have no right to 
any of the television revenue.185 
In addition to shared television revenues, the NFL and its member 
clubs created NFL Properties (“NFLP”) in 1963 to jointly license team 
and league intellectual property.186 Again, this is a valuable source of 
shared revenue for the thirty-two NFL member teams.187 While NFLP is 
mainly concerned with the most lucrative national or international spon-
sorship deals, teams do have local sponsorship and licensing arrange-
ments, most notably for stadium naming rights.188 While sponsors in pro-
fessional cycling become the name of the team and dictate the team’s 
jersey design, NFL teams only began letting sponsors place logos on 
practice jerseys in 2009, insisting that game jerseys are “sacred.”189 
Just as the business of professional football is far more lucrative than 
that of professional cycling, an NFL club’s operations are vastly more 
                                                                                                             
sponsored telecasting of the games of football, baseball, basketball, or hockey, 
as the case may be, engaged in or conducted by such clubs. 
Id. § 1291. 
 184. WONG, supra note 124, § 14.2.2, exhibit 14.1, at 719 (describing NFL’s television 
deals worth an approximate $3.7 billion annually); see Ron Borges, Players’ Union Ex-
pects ’11 Lockout, BOS. HERALD, Feb. 5, 2010, at 66; Gary Myers, Lookin’ Super Big 
Apple Should Get Ready for Big Game, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, May 23, 2010, at 69. 
 185. See Daniel Benson, Vaughters Calls for Sharing TV Revenue, CYCLINGNEWS (July 
19, 2011), http://www.cyclingnews.com/news/vaughters-calls-for-sharing-tv-revenue. 
 186. Gabriel Feldman, The Puzzling Persistence of the Single-Entity Argument for 
Sports Leagues: American Needle and the Supreme Court’s Opportunity to Reject a 
Flawed Defense, 2009 WIS. L. REV 835, 878–79. 
 187. See, e.g., Beth Hutchens, NFL Players vs. Owners: A Hail Mary of a Lawsuit, 
IPWATCHDOG (Mar. 13, 2011, 10:20 AM), http://ipwatchdog.com/2011/03/13/nfl-
players-vs-owners-a-hail-mary-of-a-lawsuit/id=15749. However, the value may be dimin-
ished in future years based on the ongoing American Needle litigation. See generally Am. 
Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 130 S.Ct. 2201, 2215 (2010). The NFL derived 
greater revenue from its exclusive license with Reebok—an arrangement that the district 
court could find unreasonably restrains trade on remand from the Supreme Court. See 
Marc Edelman, Upon Further Review: Will the NFL’s Trademark Licensing Practices 
Survive Full Antitrust Scrutiny? The Remand of American Needle v. Nat’l Football 
League, 16 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. (forthcoming 2011). 
 188. See Feldman, supra note 186, at 887–89. 
 189. Neil Best, Practice Run for Corporate Logos, NEWSDAY, Jul. 31, 2009, at A59. 
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complex and involve many more people. A preseason NFL roster has 
eighty players. In addition, an NFL team has two dozen coaches and well 
over one hundred people working in football operations, finance, human 
resources, marketing, public relations, information technology, and 
more—not to mention the thousands of people either employed by the 
team or by contract to work on game days. 
C. Players 
Perhaps the largest and most important difference between the struc-
ture of professional cycling and that of American sports is the role of the 
athletes. In each of the Big Four leagues, there is a corresponding play-
ers’ union or players association that fights for and protects the players’ 
rights pursuant to American labor law:190 the National Football Players 
Association (“NFLPA”),191 the Major League Baseball Players Associa-
tion (“MLBPA”),192 the National Basketball Players Association 
(“NBPA”),193 and the National Hockey League Players’ Association 
(“NHLPA”).194 The formation, recognition, and strength of the unions 
vary,195 but each of them negotiates a CBA with its respective league that 
                                                                                                             
 190. See MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL PLAYERS ASS’N, 
http://mlbplayers.mlb.com/pa/index.jsp (last visited Oct. 7, 2011); NAT’L BASKETBALL 
PLAYERS ASS’N, www.nbpa.com (last visited Oct. 7, 2011); NAT’L HOCKEY LEAGUE 
PLAYERS’ ASS’N, www.nhlpa.com (last visited Oct. 7, 2011); NFL PLAYERS ASS’N, 
https://www.nflplayers.com (last visited Oct. 7, 2011). The National Labor Relations Act, 
29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2006), protects “the exercise by workers of full freedom of asso-
ciation, self-organization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing, for 
the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their employment or other mutual 
aid or protection.” 29 U.S.C. § 151. 
 191. The NFPLA became the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) certified 
representative of NFL players in 1970. See History, NFL PLAYERS ASS’N, 
http://www.nflplayers.com/about-us/History (last visited Sept. 22, 2011). 
 192. The MLBPA became the NLRB certified representative of MLB players in 1969. 
See Frequently Asked Questions, MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL PLAYERS ASS’N, 
http://mlbplayers.mlb.com/pa/info/faq.jsp (last visited Sept. 22, 2011). 
 193. See About the NBPA, NAT’L BASKETBALL PLAYERS ASS’N, http://nbpa.org/about-
us (last visited Oct. 7, 2011). 
 194. See About Us, NAT’L HOCKEY LEAGUE PLAYERS’ ASS’N, http://nhlpa.com/About-
Us (last visited Oct. 7, 2011). 
 195. See WONG, supra note 124, § 11.3, at 529–71, for more information on the for-
mation, recognition and strength of the various unions. 
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governs the terms and conditions of employment,196 as well as many oth-
er matters.197 
Although most fans only pay attention to the CBAs when the failure to 
agree to one threatens play,198 CBAs are the core around which the 
league, teams, the union, players, coaches, agents, and others base their 
actions. The recently expired 301-page NFL-NFLPA CBA contemplated 
almost all the activities which would affect a player, including the entry 
draft,199 minimum salaries,200 practice limits,201 team and league disci-
pline,202 free agency,203 limits on player compensation,204 player benefits 
                                                                                                             
 196. Certain subjects are considered “mandatory” subjects of bargaining, including pay 
rates, discipline, drug testing, safety, grievance procedures, benefits, and severance com-
pensation. See WONG, supra note 124, § 11.2.2, at 527. 
 197. In addition to “mandatory” subjects, the parties are free to negotiate on “permis-
sive” subjects of bargaining, such as a change in the bargaining unit, the status of super-
visors, settlement of unfair labor practice charges, or internal union or company affairs. 
Id. 
 198. In the NFL, the players went on strike during training camp in 1970, 1974, and 
1975, though no regular season games were lost. Paul D. Staudohar, The Football Strike 
of 1987: The Question of Free Agency, MONTHLY LAB. R., Aug. 1988, at 26  [hereinafter 
Staudohar, Football Strike]; Kevin Jackman & Bobby Mette, NFL Lockout: An In-Depth 
Look at Past Labor Disputes in Sports, B/R BLEACHER REP. (June 5, 2011), 
http://bleacherreport.com/articles/724433-nfl-lockout-an-in-depth-look-at-past-labor-
diputes-in-sports-current-nfl-issue; Evan Weiner, Countdown to the Real Kickoff—the 
NFL Lockout in 2011, DAILY CALLER (Mar. 10, 2010, 11:56 AM), 
http://dailycaller.com/2010/03/01/countdown-to-the-real-kickoff-%e2%80%93-the-nfl-
lockout-in-2011. During the 1982 season the players went on a fifty-seven-day strike that 
reduced the regular season to nine games. WONG, supra note 124, § 11.3.3, at 531; Ray 
Fittipaldo, History Shows Team Unity During A Work Stoppage is Harbinger of Later 
Success, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, June 14, 2011, at D.1. The players struck for twen-
ty-four days during the 1987 season, reducing the regular season to fifteen games. Jack-
man & Mette, supra. In MLB, players went on strike in 1972, 1980, 1981, 1985, and 
1994–95, the last costing baseball its first missed World Series since 1905. Aaron Couch, 
Five Worst Labor Disputes in Sports, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, (Mar. 11, 2011), 
http://www.csmonitor.com/layout/set/print/content/view/print/367362. Owners locked the 
players out in 1973, 1976, and 1990. Jackman & Mette, supra. In the NBA, the players 
have never gone on strike, but the owners locked the players out in 1995, 1996, and 
1998–99. WONG, supra note 124, § 11.3.4, at 533. In the NHL, the players went on a ten-
day strike in 1992 and the owners locked the players out in 1994–95 and 2004–05, cost-
ing the league an entire season. Both Sides of NHL Labor Dispute Had Winners and Los-
ers, VANCOUVER SUN, Jan. 14, 1995, at A.14; Couch, supra; Alan Adams, Officials Fear 
NHL Lockout Tarnishing Game, OTTAWA CITIZEN, Nov. 20, 1994, at D.3. 
 199. See NFL CBA, supra note 114, art. XVI, at 46–50. 
 200. See id. art. XXXVIII, at 179–82. 
 201. See id. art. XXXVII, § 5, at 177. 
 202. See id. art. VIII, at 19–22 & art. XI, at 34–35. 
 203. See id. art. XIX, at 57–67. 
 204. See id. art. XXIV, at 82–144. 
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and insurance,205 the standard player contract,206 grievance procedures,207 
severance pay,208 and more. The legal basis for the players and teams to 
reach such a complex agreement will be discussed in more detail later. 
In contrast, the Joint Agreements negotiated between the riders union, 
CPA, and the AIGCP is ten pages, covering only the most basic provi-
sions, such as minimum salaries,209 bonus and prize money,210 minimum 
vacation days,211 and health insurance.212 Notably, the Joint Agreements 
do not address drug testing. Not surprisingly, the CPA has little to no 
budget and few, if any, full-time employees.213 In contrast, the NFLPA 
has over one hundred employees in a variety of capacities, notably Play-
ers Inc., the union’s marketing arm, and a small army of experienced and 
talented attorneys led by Executive Director DeMaurice Smith.214 
Free agency has historically been the most important issue for Ameri-
can team sport athletes.215 The path to true free agency in the NFL was a 
little longer than in other Big Four sports; the NFLPA made the ques-
tionable decision to give up free agency during collective bargaining ne-
gotiations in 1977 in return for an increase in pay, pensions, and bene-
fits.216 After a contentious legal battle that saw the NFLPA decertified as 
the official bargaining representative of the players amidst several anti-
trust lawsuits,217 the NFLPA and NFL agreed to a substantially changed 
                                                                                                             
 205. See id. art. XLIV, at 197–98 & art. XLIX, at 218–20. 
 206. See id. art. XIV, § 7, app. C, at 248–56. 
 207. See id. art. IX–X, at 23–33. 
 208. See id. art. XXXV, § 8, app. L, at 288. 
 209. UCI Regulations, Joint Agreements, supra note 103, ch. II, art. 10, at 172–73. 
 210. Id. ch. II, arts. 11–14, at 173–77. 
 211. Riders are entitled to a minimum of thirty-five vacation days per year. Id. ch. II, 
art. 17, at 174. 
 212. Id. ch. II, arts. 22–23, at 173–74. 
 213. Interview with John Wilcockson, supra note 69. 
 214. Smith was elected as Executive Director in 2009 following the death of long-time 
Executive Director and Hall of Fame player Eugene Upshaw. Larry Weisman, Players 
Lose Leader; Football Loses Legend; Gene Upshaw, Dead at 63, Leaves Major Mark on 
Sport, USA TODAY, Aug. 22, 2008, at C.1; Executive Director, NFL PLAYER’S ASS’N, 
https://www.nflplayers.com/About-us/NFLPA-Officers/Executive-Director (last visited 
Oct. 7, 2011) [hereinafter NFLPA Executive Director]. Prior to joining the NFLPA, 
Smith was a trial lawyer and litigation partner at D.C. law firm Patton Boggs, where he 
concentrated on white-collar criminal defense and tort liability trials. NFLPA Executive 
Director, supra. He also previously served as Counsel to then Deputy Attorney General 
Eric Holder in the U.S. Department of Justice before entering private practice. Id. 
 215. See, e.g., Deubert & Wong, supra note 116, at 183–91 (describing a period of 
rapid growth in the NFL following the first CBA granting unrestricted free agency). 
 216. Id. at 186. 
 217. Id. at 188. In 1987, Marvin Powell, other players, and the NFLPA sued the NFL 
challenging the player movement restrictions. The Eighth Circuit ruled that because the 
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NFL CBA in 1993, implementing a salary cap and unrestricted free 
agency for players who have at least four Accrued Seasons.218 Players 
with three Accrued Seasons are free agents subject to certain restrictions 
and compensation for his original team.219 Players with less than three 
Accrued Seasons are the exclusive property of their current club provid-
ed the current club makes them an offer in compliance with the CBA.220 
The ability of teams to control players for their earliest years in the 
league is generally referred to as the Reserve System.221 
Obviously an important part of a player’s free agency is negotiation 
with new teams. Whereas in professional cycling a rider negotiates his 
next contract while still under his current one, such actions are strictly 
forbidden in the NFL. A team may not negotiate with a player or his 
agent until his contract has expired at the conclusion of the league year, 
on or around March 1.222 Doing so is impermissible tampering and can 
                                                                                                             
players were still unionized, the nonstatutory labor exemption from antitrust laws still 
applied and would continue to apply so long as there was a possibility that proceedings 
could still be brought before the NLRB. See Powell v. Nat’l Football League, 930 F.2d 
1293, 1303–04 (8th Cir. 1989). Based on the Eighth Circuit’s recommendation, the 
NFLPA decertified and players brought another antitrust suit, in which the district court 
agreed that the NFL’s most recent incarnation of the Rozelle Rule, Plan B free agency 
system, was an unreasonable restraint of trade. See McNeil v. Nat’l Football League, 790 
F. Supp. 871 (D. Minn. 1992). Next, NFL players, led by Reggie White, brought a suit 
for treble damages under antitrust law. White v. Nat’l Football League, 836 F. Supp. 
1458, 1461 (D. Minn. 1993). The case was settled as the modern NFL-NFLPA CBA was 
reached. Id. at 1462; Jarrett Bell, Timeline of NFL Labor Disputes, U.S.A. TODAY (Mar. 
12, 2011), http://www.usatoday.com/sports/football/nfl/2011-03-03-nfl-labor-disputes-
timeline_N.htm. 
 218. See NFL CBA, supra note 114, art. XIX, § 1(a), at 57. A player earns an “Ac-
crued Season” when he is on full pay status for six or more regular season games. Id. art 
XVIII, § 1(a), at 56. 
 219. Id. art XIX, § 2(a), at 58. 
 220. Id. art XVII, § 2, at 56. 
 221. See WONG, supra note 124, at 847 (refer to the “Reserve Clause” glossary term). 
 222. In 2008, the NFL took away the San Francisco 49ers fifth-round draft pick for 
tampering with Chicago Bears linebacker Lance Briggs. See Vaughn McClure, 49ers Still 
Pay for Briggs, Tampering Charge Costs Them a Pick, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 25, 2008, at 2. 
There have been many other suspected cases of tampering in recent years including: the 
New York Jets in 2009 with 49ers wide receiver Michael Crabtree, in 2009 the Washing-
ton Redskins with former Tennessee Titans defensive lineman Albert Haynesworth, and 
in 2008 the Minnesota Vikings with Green Bay Packers quarterback Brett Favre. See 
John Crumpacker, Tampering Charges Likely Aimed at Jets, S.F. CHRON., Sep. 22, 2009, 
at B1; Ryan O’Halloran, Nearly Tamper Proof, Violations in NFL Are Hard to Substanti-
ate, WASH. TIMES (D.C.), Mar. 13, 2009, at C02; Jason Wilde, Packers File Tampering 
Charge; They Claim Vikings Coach Darrell Bevell Had “Inappropriate Dialogue” with 
the QB, WIS. ST. J., Jul. 17, 2008, at F1. 
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result in punishment by the Commissioner in the form of forfeited draft 
picks and/or a fine.223 
One of the principal ways in which players move between teams is by 
trades, in which players are exchanged for each other. Trades are less 
common in the NFL than other American sports because of salary cap 
complications,224 but do occur frequently. Trades, which are the legal 
assignment of a player’s contract to another team in exchange for the 
same, do not occur in professional cycling. Furthermore, when they do 
occur in European sports, they generally occur as part of a transfer 
agreement in which a significant sum of cash is involved. American 
sports generally do not allow for the sale of players.225 
In recent years, one of the most contentious issues for NFL players and 
NFL alumni has been their disability benefits and health insurance.226 As 
stories of former players suffering from serious and permanent injuries 
and disabilities have become commonplace, the NFL has been forced by 
public perception and government rebuke227 to increase its funding to 
retired players228 while also doing more to prevent serious injuries to cur-
rent players.229 
                                                                                                             
 223. See McClure, supra note 222. 
 224. See Ari Nissim, Note, The Trading Game: NFL Free Agency, The Salary Cap, 
and Proposal for Greater Trading Flexibility, 11 SPORTS LAW. J. 257, 266–67 (2004). 
Nissim is currently the Director of Football Administration for the New York Jets. Ari 
Nissim on 1050 ESPN Inside the Jets, N.Y. JETS, http://www.newyorkjets.com/media-
lounge/videos/Ari-Nissim-on-1050-ESPN-Inside-the-Jets/a7b7d62a-8688-4d19-814e-
fc14ee5356cc (last visited Sept. 30, 2011). 
 225. In 1976, Oakland Athletics owner Charlie Finley attempted to sell star pitcher 
Vida Blue to the New York Yankees and left fielder and pitcher Rollie Fingers to the 
Boston Red Sox rather than lose them to the newly established free agency in baseball. 
See Charles O. Finley & Co., Inc. v. Kuhn, 569 F.2d 527, 530–31 (7th Cir. 1978). MLB 
Commissioner Bowie Kuhn vetoed the deals as not in the best interests of baseball. Id. at 
531. Finley sued, but a federal court upheld Commissioner Kuhn’s powers. See id. at 543. 
 226. See Erika A. Diehl, Note, What’s All the Headache?: Reform Needed to Cope 
with the Effects of Concussions in Football, 23 J.L. & HEALTH 83, 114–116 (2010); Dan-
iel J. Kain, Note, “It’s Just a Concussion”: The National Football League’s Denial of a 
Causal Link Between Multiple Concussions and Later-Life Cognitive Decline, 40 
RUTGERS L.J. 697, 697 (2009); Brett Edwin LoVellette, Comment, “Mortal Kombat in 
Cleats”: An Examination of the National Football League’s Disability Plan and Its Im-
pact on Retired Players, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 1101, 1106 (2009). 
 227. The House Judiciary Committee has held two hearings (one in October 2009 and 
one in May 2010) on concussions in football and the NFL’s lackluster response. Barry 
Wilner, House Has Say on Concussions, STAR-LEDGER (N.J.), May 25, 2010, at 32. 
 228. See Wayne Coffey, When the Cheers Stop. After Giving His Body to the NFL, 
Jimmie Giles Is in Fight of His Life, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Dec. 27, 2009, at 78; Mike Hern-
don, Bennett Tackles New Challenge, PRESS-REGISTER (Ala.), Jul. 15, 2010, at B3; Fred 
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NFL players earn substantially more than professional cyclists. NFL 
players’ minimum salaries are based on their level of experience and 
other contractual arrangements,230 but generally, in 2010, the minimum 
salary was $320,000, nearly eight times that of a ProTour rider.231 
III. LEGAL BASIS FOR IMPROVING PROFESSIONAL CYCLING 
Team and rider continuity is essential to the health of professional cy-
cling. Although fans have their favorite riders and the sport is individual 
in its trophies, the sport is a team sport and the health of the business of 
cycling depends on the health of its teams. However, from 2001 to 2010, 
on average, 52% of the riders of the Tour de France were either new rid-
ers or with a new team as compared to the previous year’s Tour.232 On 
average, a team returning to the Tour from the previous year did so with 
four new riders out of a team of nine.233 Although this turnover could be 
from a variety of factors, such as retirement, injury, skill, or doping bans, 
the fact that large percentages of riders change teams and teams change 
names each year makes the sport difficult for fans to follow. 
If a sponsor is going to derive meaningful benefit from its association 
with a team, it will want that team to develop a consistent fan base. An 
important part of developing a consistent fan base is having consistency 
within the team roster and nomenclature—if teams are changing spon-
sors every year or two, it becomes difficult to remember who all the 
teams are and who all of their riders are as well. On average, three out of 
the twenty-one teams that started each Tour de France from 2001 
through 2010 were not in the previous year’s race.234 In addition, during 
                                                                                                             
Mitchell, Former Players to Get More Aid; Gridiron Greats Fund Secures Commitments 
for Medical Assistance, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 28, 2009, at C2. 
 229. In 2010 the NFL donated $1 million to help study the long-term effects of playing 
football and the related brain trauma. See Alan Schwarz, N.F.L. Gives $1 Million to Brain 
Researchers, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 2010, at B14. Also, beginning with the 2010 season, 
all NFL locker rooms have a poster warning players of the long-term effects of multiple 
concussions. Editorial, Are You Ready for Some Football?, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 2010, at 
WK7. 
 230. Players can sign “split” contracts whereby they earn a lower amount if they are 
not on the club’s Active/Inactive List, i.e. on injured reserve. NFL CBA, supra note 114, 
art. XXXVIII, § 14, at 181. A player’s minimum salary increased approximately $75,000 
for each Credited Season. Id. § 6, at 179. 
 231. Id.; UCI Regulations, Joint Agreements, supra note 103. 
 232. See generally Races & Results: Tour de France Previous Years, CYCLINGNEWS, 
http://www.cyclingnews.com/tour-de-france (last visited Sept. 23, 2011) (This data was 
calculated by examining the Start Lists from the 2001 to 2010 Tours de France.). 
 233. Id. 
 234. See Tour de France 2000; Startlist, Participating Teams and Riders, VIVELO 
BIKES, http://tour.cyclingfever.com/editie.html?detp=view&_ap=startlijst&editie_id=448 
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the same time period, an average of 4.3 teams entered the Tour with at 
least one new or changed principal sponsor from the previous year.235 
Consequently, about a third (3 plus 4.3) of the Tour’s teams are not read-
ily apparent or distinguishable in their identities each year. 
There are a number of areas in which professional cycling could be 
improved through the adoption, application, or replication of some typi-
cal American sport features, including team collaboration, free agency, 
contractual creativity, and revenue generation. European labor and anti-
trust or competition law play an important role in these areas. Many of 
these issues can be dealt with through collective bargaining as in Ameri-
can sports. 
A. Labor Relations in Professional Cycling, the United States and the EC 
The National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”) governs the relationship 
between employers and employees under American labor law.236 Specifi-
cally, the NLRA protects “the exercise by workers of full freedom of 
association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of their 
own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of 
their employment or other mutual aid or protection.”237 Furthermore, the 
Clayton Act statutorily exempts organized labor from antitrust law.238 
This exemption applies most importantly to Section 1 of the Sherman 
Antitrust Act, which prohibits any contract, combination, or conspiracy 
that unreasonably retrains trade,239 and Section 2, which prohibits the 
attempted monopolization of trade or commerce.240 
                                                                                                             
(follow “2001” hyperlink to view startlist for 2001 Tour de France; follow “2002” hyper-
link to view startlist for 2002 Tour de France; etc.) (last visited Oct. 2, 2011). 
 235. Id. 
 236. National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2006). 
 237. Id. § 151. 
 238. 15 U.S.C. § 17 (2006). 
The labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of commerce. Noth-
ing contained in the antitrust laws shall be construed to forbid the existence and 
operation of labor, agricultural, or horticultural organizations, instituted for the 
purposes of mutual help, and not having capital stock or conducted for profit, 
or to forbid or restrain individual members of such organizations from lawfully 
carrying out the legitimate objects thereof; nor shall such organizations, or the 
members thereof, be held or construed to be illegal combinations or conspira-
cies in restraint of trade, under the antitrust laws. 
Id. 
 239. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006); see also Cont’l T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 
36 (1977); Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 87 (1911). 
 240. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2006). 
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In American sports leagues, there are many agreements among the 
leagues’ member clubs that would generally draw antitrust scrutiny un-
der Section 1. For example, the thirty-two NFL teams agree to ways to 
control salaries through the use of a salary cap,241 maximum contract 
lengths for rookies,242 and a minimum number of years experience that a 
player must accrue before he can become a free agent.243 These agree-
ments are exempt from antitrust law by reaching a CBA with the players’ 
union, as will be explained in more detail below. 
In cycling, race organizers such as ASO, as the most financially sol-
vent bodies, have tremendous power in the sport of cycling. In addition, 
the UCI sets nearly all of the substantive regulations for the sport.244 
However, the only two bodies that have the legal authority to control the 
terms and conditions of rider employment are the riders’ union, the CPA, 
and the employing teams, the AIGCP. 
Articles 11 and 28 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the Euro-
pean Union govern the right of EU employees to unionize and bargain 
collectively.245 Article 11 states that “[e]veryone has the right to freedom 
of peaceful assembly and to freedom of association at all levels, in par-
ticular in political, trade union and civic matters, which implies the right 
of everyone to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his or 
her interests.”246 Furthermore, Article 28 provides that “[w]orkers and 
employers, or their respective organisations, have . . . the right to negoti-
ate and conclude collective agreements at the appropriate levels and, in 
cases of conflicts of interest, to take collective action to defend their in-
terests, including strike action.247 
Whereas the NLRA directs that employees and employers should ne-
gotiate over the “terms and conditions of their employment,”248 EC law 
has no such mandate. American labor law states or has ruled that certain 
topics are mandatory subjects of bargaining, such as wages and hours249 
                                                                                                             
 241. See generally NFL CBA, supra note 114, art. XXIV, at 82 (detailing the NFL’s 
“guaranteed league-wide salary, salary-cap, [and] minimum team salary”). 
 242. Id. art. XVII, § 5, at 55. Players drafted in the first sixteen picks can sign deals of 
six years in length. Id. Players drafted in the second half of the first round can sign con-
tracts up to five years in length. Id. All other rookies are limited to contracts of four years 
in length. Id. 
 243. See infra text accompanying notes 255–62. 
 244. UCI Constitution, supra note 14, ch. I, art. 2, at 1. 
 245. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, arts. 11, 28, 2007 O.J. (C 
303). 
 246. Id. art. 11, at 5. 
 247. Id. art. 28, at 8. 
 248. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2006). 
 249. Id. 
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and drug testing,250 while all others are merely permissive subjects of 
bargaining.251 
As discussed earlier, the Joint Agreements between the riders’ CPA 
and the teams’ AIGCP is a weak and short document. The CPA and the 
AIGCP failed to take advantage of their potential to control their liveli-
hoods by exercising their rights to reach an agreement on all the substan-
tive issues in professional cycling, as is done in American sports. The 
two groups instead acquiesce their legal power and rights to the UCI and 
the race organizers. 
Again, the teams do not host events from which to draw revenue, as 
they do in American sports. Consequently, the teams are unstable eco-
nomic entities with little ability to enforce their rights. At the same time, 
the riders are modestly paid employees in an unstable profession who 
likely choose instead to play by the existing rules rather than create ca-
reer-threatening controversy. However, several professional athletes have 
essentially sacrificed parts of their career for the betterment of their 
brethren, including Jean-Marc Bosman, as discussed earlier, and Curt 
Flood in MLB.252 Professional cycling needs a rider or riders willing to 
fight for the best interests of the riders, while the teams too must be will-
ing to fight for their share of the control. 
                                                                                                             
 250. Consol. Rail Corp. v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 491 U.S. 299 (1989); see also 
Johnson-Bateman Co., 295 N.L.R.B. 180 (1989). 
 251. See Pittsburgh & Lake Erie R.R. Co. v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 491 U.S. 
490, 491 (1989) (ruling that employer did not have to bargain with union over decision to 
sell company assets); First Nat’l Maint. Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 452 U.S. 666, 687 (1981) 
(ruling that employer had no duty to bargain with union over decision to terminate a con-
tract with one of its commercial customers purely for economic reasons); N.L.R.B. v. 
Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 362 (1958) (ruling that a union 
recognition clause was not a mandatory subject of bargaining). 
 252. Flood was an All-Star outfielder for the St. Louis Cardinals in the 1960s. See 
Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 264 (1972). In October 1969, Flood was traded to the Phil-
adelphia Phillies. Id. at 265. Flood refused to go to Philadelphia, id. at 266, in part be-
cause he, an African-American, believed the Phillies had racist fans. Howard Burns, 
Flood’s Sacrifice Sports’ Most Meaningful Trade, SPORT’S COUCH POTATO (July 13, 
2011), http://sportscouchpotato.com/2014/flood. Flood sued MLB Commissioner Bowie 
Kuhn and MLB challenging baseball’s reserve clause as a violation of antitrust laws. 
Flood, 407 U.S. at 265. The case eventually reached the United States Supreme Court, 
which ruled against Flood based on baseball’s judicially created antitrust exemption es-
tablished fifty years earlier in Federal Baseball Club v. National League, 259 U.S. 200 
(1922). Flood, 407 U.S. at 282–85. Flood never reported to the Phillies and played only 
thirteen more games with the Washington Senators in 1971 after sitting out the entire 
1970 season. Id. at 266. 
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Certainly the collective bargaining relationship has caused several 
painful work stoppages in American sports,253 but through the adversarial 
process, unions and leagues have been successful in creating tremen-
dously lucrative partnerships.254 
As mentioned earlier, in the United States, the joint activity of employ-
ees through union conduct is statutorily exempt from antitrust law.255 The 
joint activity and agreements of multiple employers, such as the thirty-
two NFL teams, can also be exempt from antitrust law in collective bar-
gaining negotiations with a union. This exemption is known as the non-
statutory labor exemption and has been developed through case law.256 
The necessary conditions for satisfaction of the exemption were defini-
tively laid out in the context of the NFL labor situation in Mackey v. Na-
                                                                                                             
 253. NFL players went on strike from September 21 through November 16, 1982—
reducing the season to nine games, Gene Wojciechowski, NFL Strike: 1982; A History 
Lesson Not Learned, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 23, 1987, at 1; Len Pasquarelli, Lengthy Strike 
Has Mostly Been Forgotten, ESPN (Sept. 21, 2007), 
http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/columns/story?columnist=pasquarelli_len&id=3030311; 
NFL players went on strike from September 22 through October 15, 1987—forcing the 
NFL to use replacement players for weeks four through six, Staudohar, Football Strike, 
supra note 198, at 28–30; MLB players went on strike from August 12, 1994 through 
March 31, 1995—forcing the first-ever cancellation of the World Series, WONG, supra 
note 124, § 11.3.5, at 534; Paul D. Staudohar, The Baseball Strike of 1994–95, MONTHLY 
LAB. R., Mar. 1997, at 25–26; Couch, supra note 198; NBA owners locked the players 
out from July 1, 1998 through January 6, 1999—significantly shortening the regular sea-
son, WONG, supra note 124, § 11.3.4, at 533; Paul D. Staudohar, Labor Relations in Bas-
ketball: The Lockout of 1998–99, MONTHLY LAB. R., Apr. 1999, at 5, 8; NHL owners 
locked the players from September 16, 2004 through July 13, 2005—canceling an entire 
season, Paul D. Staudohar, The Hockey Lockout of 2004–05, MONTHLY LAB. R., Dec. 
2005, at 23, 26, 27. 
 254. See, e.g., Chris Isidore, Baseball Close to Catching NFL as Top $ Sport, CNN 
MONEY (Oct. 25, 2007), http:// mon-
ey.cnn.com/2007/10/25/commentary/sportsbiz/index.htm (stating that in 2007 MLB gen-
erated over $6 billion in revenue); John Lombardo, NBA Increases Shared Revenue by 63 
Percent, SPORTS BUS. J. (Apr. 28, 2008), 
http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/Journal/Issues/2008/04/20080428/This-Weeks-
News/NBA-Increases-Shared-Revenue-By-63-Percent.aspx (noting that “the NBA’s total 
revenue-sharing pool increase[d] by 63 percent”). Tripp Mickle, Escrow Cash Will Boost 
NHL, SPORTS BUS. J. (Mar. 2, 2009), 
http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/Journal/Issues/2009/03/20090302/This-Weeks-
News/Escrow-Cash-Will-Boost-
NHL.aspx?hl=%22escrow%20cash%20will%20boost%20NHL%22&sc=0 (noting that in 
2009, the NHL is generated approximately $2.64 billion). 
 255. Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 17 (2006). 
 256. United Mine Workers of Am. v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 676, 710 (1965) (“[I]n 
order to effectuate congressional intent, collective bargaining activity concerning manda-
tory subjects of bargaining under the Labor Act is not subject to the antitrust laws.”). 
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tional Football League.257 In Mackey, NFL players challenged the NFL’s 
Rozelle Rule, which allowed Commissioner Rozelle to determine the 
compensation paid to a free agent’s former team if he signed with a new 
team.258 The Eighth Circuit stated that for the conduct of joint employers 
to be protected by the non-statutory labor exemption, (1) “the restraint on 
trade [must] primarily affect[] only the parties to the [CBA],” (2) the is-
sue must “concern a mandatory subject of bargaining,” and (3) the issue 
must have been achieved through “bona fide arm’s-length bargaining.”259 
This non-statutory labor exemption has served as the backbone for nego-
tiations between American player unions and leagues. Probably the 
greatest leverage any of the unions have in collective bargaining negotia-
tions is the threat that they will decertify their union and sue the league 
on antitrust grounds when the non-statutory labor exemption no longer 
applies.260 EC law does not provide a statutory exemption from antitrust 
law for either unions or joint employers. However, EC law has devel-
oped a non-statutory labor exemption upon which a meaningful collec-
tive bargaining agreement in professional cycling can be based.261 
                                                                                                             
 257. Mackey v. Nat’l Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 614 (8th Cir. 1976). 
 258. Mackey v. Nat’l Football League, 407 F. Supp. 1000, 1002 (D. Minn. 1975), aff’d 
in relevant part, 543 F.2d 610 (8th Cir. 1976). 
 259. Mackey, 543 F.2d at 614. 
 260. In 1989, the NFLPA decertified as the official bargaining unit of NFL players, 
permitting NFL players to successfully bring an antitrust suit against the NFL challenging 
its free agency restrictions. See McNeil v. Nat’l Football League, 790 F. Supp. 871, 896 
(D. Minn. 1992). Thereafter, future Hall of Fame defensive end Reggie White led a class 
action lawsuit against the NFL for treble damages under antitrust laws. White v. Nat’l 
Football League, 836 F. Supp. 1458, 1461 (D. Minn. 1993). The White suit led to a $200 
million settlement and the NFL CBA that lasted from 1993 through the 2010 season. See 
Will McDonough, Tentative Deal Reached In NFL Free Agency Among Concessions 
Made by Owners to NFL Players, BOS. GLOBE, Dec. 23, 1992, at 59. The NFLPA later 
recertified as the representative of the players but following a breakdown in NFL-NFLPA 
labor negotiations in 2011, the NFLPA decertified again and immediately filed a class 
action antitrust lawsuit. Brady v. Nat’l Football League, No. 11-cv-00639, 2011 WL 
1535240, at *2 (D. Minn. Apr. 25, 2011). That lawsuit was settled as part of a new CBA 
in July 2011 and the NFLPA shortly thereafter recertified as the official bargaining repre-
sentative of NFL players. NFL Lockout Timeline, USA TODAY (July 21, 2011, 9:43 PM), 
http://www.usatoday.com/sports/football/nfl/2011-07-21-lockout-timeline_n.htm. 
 261. The preeminent article on this topic is Marc Edelman & Brian Doyle, Antitrust 
and “Free Movement” Risks of Expanding U.S. Professional Sports Leagues into Eu-
rope, 29 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 403, 419–20 (2009). 
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B. EC Competition Law and the Non-Statutory Labor Exemption 
There are two main provisions of EC competition (antitrust) law from 
which a non-statutory labor exemption will enable a successful collective 
bargaining agreement in professional cycling. 
i. Article 101 of the TFEU 
Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(“TFEU”) (formerly Article 81), is very similar to Section 1 of the Sher-
man Act under American antitrust law.262 Article 101(1) prohibits “all 
agreements . . . decisions . . . and concerted practices which may affect 
trade between Member States and which have as their object or effect the 
prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the internal 
market . . . .”263 Article 101(1) goes on to list specific conduct that is 
prohibited, including fixing prices,264 limiting production,265 the sharing 
of markets,266 treating trade partners differently,267 and conditioning the 
conclusion of a contract on supplementary obligations.268 
Agreements in violation of Article 101(1) are “automatically void,”269 
in the same sense that, under American law, “certain agreements or prac-
tices which because of their pernicious effect on competition and lack of 
any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and 
therefore illegal” per se.270 However, EC case law has also found that “a 
rule which at first sight appears to contain a restriction that is necessary 
                                                                                                             
 262. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 
101, Mar. 30, 2010, 2010 O.J. (C 83) 88 [hereinafter TFEU], available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/index.htm; Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006). Like-
wise, Article 102 is very similar to Section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act. Compare 
TFEU art. 102, with Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2006). 
 263. TFEU art. 101(1). 
 264. Id. art. 101(1)(a). 
 265. Id. art. 101(1)(b). 
 266. Id. art. 101(1)(c). 
 267. See id. art. 101(1)(d). 
 268. Id. art. 101(1)(e). 
 269. Id. art. 101(2). 
 270. N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958); see also Arizona v. Mari-
copa Cnty. Med. Soc., 457 U.S. 332, 348 (1982) (holding that maximum prices are illegal 
per se); Fashion Originators’ Guild of Am. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 312 U.S. 457, 465 
(1941) (holding that group boycotts aimed at non-cooperating retailers or manufacturers 
are illegal per se); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 218 (1940) 
(holding price fixing illegal per se). 
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in order to make that competition possible in the first place, it must be 
assumed that rule does not infringe Article [101(1)].”271 
Article 101(3) also provides that certain agreements or practices may 
not violate Article 101(1) if they contribute “to improving the production 
or distribution of goods or to promoting technical or economic progress, 
while allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit.”272 In ad-
dition, the agreements (1) must be “indispensable to the attainment of 
[Article 101(1)’s] objectives,” and (2) cannot provide the possibility of 
eliminating a substantial portion of competition for the product in ques-
tion.273 
ii. Article 45 of the TFEU 
Article 45 (formerly Article 39) of the TFEU secures the freedom of 
movement for workers.274 The law forbids employment “discrimination 
based on nationality between workers of the Member States.”275 This 
statute was also part of the basis for the Bosman ruling discussed earlier, 
since at the time the Union of European Football Associations had rules 
limiting the number of non-nationals that could be on a team, at the time 
Manchester United, an English team playing in the English Premier 
League, was only allowed to have five non-English players on its 
team.276 As a result of the Bosman ruling, FIFA, through negotiations 
with the EC, has changed many of its rules so as to comply with EC 
law.277 
The ECJ has stated that the free movement of workers is a fundamental 
right under EC law,278 and that any agreement restricting such rights will 
not be exempt based on a purported non-statutory labor exemption.279 
This absolute view of workers rights does not exist in American law and 
limits available remedial measures for professional cycling. 
                                                                                                             
 271. Edelman & Doyle, supra note 261, at 418 (citing Bosman, 1995 E.C.R. I-04921, ¶ 
265).  
 272. TFEU art. 101(3). 
 273. See Edelman & Doyle, supra note 246, at 418 (citing TFEU art. 101(3)(a)–(b)). 
 274. TFEU art. 45(1). 
 275. Id. art. 45(2). 
 276. Bosman, 1995 E.C.R. I-04921, ¶ 27. 
 277. Jean-Christian Drolet, Extra Time: Are the New FIFA Transfer Rules Doomed?, 
INT’L SPORTS L.J., Jan.–Apr. 2006, at 66, 66. 
 278. Bosman, 1995 E.C.R. I-04921, ¶ 92; Edelman & Doyle, supra note 261, at 423. 
 279. Edelman & Doyle, supra note 261, at 423. 
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iii. The Non-Statutory Labor Exemption in the EC 
To establish a non-statutory labor exemption under EC law, a defend-
ant must establish that (1) a CBA exists between management and labor, 
(2) the CBA was conducted in good faith, (3) on core subjects of collec-
tive bargaining, and (4) that the CBA does not directly affect third mar-
kets and third parties.280 The first three prongs are substantially similar to 
the Mackey Test in American law. The fourth prong is unique to EC law 
and may contradict American labor law that allows unions to negotiate 
CBA provisions, which affect persons not yet a part of the bargaining 
unit.281 As a result of this fourth prong, certain agreements common in 
the Big Four CBAs, such as minimum age requirements282 and drafts,283 
would probably not be legal in the EC.284 
                                                                                                             
 280. Id. at 430 (citing Case C-222/98, Van der Woude v. Stichting Beatrixoord, 2000 
E.C.R. I–7111, ¶¶ 22–27; Case C-67/96, Albany Int’l BV v. Stichting Bedrijfspensioen-
fonds Textielindustrie, 1999 E.C.R. I–5751, ¶ 296). 
 281. Wood v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 809 F.2d 954, 960 (2d Cir. 1987) (citing 29 
U.S.C. § 152(3) (2006)); see also Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 379 U.S. 
203, 210–15 (1964); Time-O-Matic, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 264 F.2d 96, 99 (7th Cir. 1959); 
John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. N.L.R.B., 191 F.2d 483, 485 (D.C. Cir. 1951). In 
Wood, Leon Wood, a first round pick in the 1984 NBA Draft sued the NBA and NBPA 
claiming that the CBA between the two parties, including a salary cap and draft, violated 
antitrust laws as it applied to Wood because it was agreed to before Wood was a member 
of the NBPA. 809 F.2d at 958, 960. The court disagreed and ruled that the CBA was 
protected by the non-statutory labor exemption and Wood was subject to its provisions. 
Id. at 906–64. 
 282. The NBA requires all players to be at least nineteen years old, and if he’s Ameri-
can, at least one NBA season must have elapsed since he graduated (or should have grad-
uated) high school. NBA CBA, supra note 114, art. X, § 1(b)(1), at 225. The NFL re-
quires that at least “three NFL regular seasons have begun and ended following either his 
graduation from high school or graduation of the class with which he entered high school, 
whichever is earlier.” NFL CBA, supra note 114, art. XVI, § 2(b), at 46. Prior to the 2006 
extension of the CBA, this rule was not specifically in the CBA but instead only in the 
NFL Bylaws and Constitution. Michael A. McCann & Joseph S. Rosen, Legality of Age 
Restrictions in the NBA and the NFL, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 731, 732–33 (2006). After 
the Maurice Clarett lawsuit, Clarett v. Nat’l Football League, 306 F. Supp. 2d 379 
(S.D.N.Y.), rev’d in part, vacated in part, 369 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2004), the NFL and 
NFLPA negotiated the inclusion of the rule into the CBA. McCann & Rosen, supra at 
744. 
 283. All of the Big Four leagues have drafts through which most of its players enter 
the league. See First-Year Player Draft Rules, MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL, 
http://mlb.mlb.com/mlb/draftday/rules.jsp (last visited Oct. 7, 2011); NBA CBA, supra 
note 114, art. X, § 1(a), at 225; NFL CBA, supra note 114, pmbl., at 3; NHL CBA, supra 
note 114, art. 8, § 8.1, at 17. 
 284. See Edelman & Doyle, supra note 261, at 424. 
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In addition to these specific CBA provisions, American sports leagues 
contain many other provisions, such as salary caps and free agency re-
strictions, that would likely violate Section 1 of the Sherman Act if not 
for the non-statutory labor exemption. Accordingly, these provisions 
would also likely violate Article 101(1) of the TFEU—though some 
would be exempt by the EC non-statutory labor exemption or even the 
exemption described in Article 101(3). 
However, unlike in American labor law, employers and unions cannot 
collectively bargain away an employee’s fundamental right to “free 
movement” under Article 45. Consequently, a cycling team’s ability to 
control a young rider for the first couple of years through a draft or re-
serve system is questionable. 
Nevertheless, professional cycling teams should consider adopting 
many of the provisions or practices of American sports leagues. Many of 
the issues needing attention can be resolved through a CBA between the 
CPA and the AIGCP pursuant to the EC non-statutory labor exemption. 
However, the proposed reforms will require careful compliance with Ar-
ticles 101 and 45 of the TFEU. 
Having established the legal framework within which the professional 
cycling world must work to improve, this Article will now discuss some 
of the specific aspects of professional cycling operations which should be 
modified, abolished, or created. 
IV. AREAS OF IMPROVEMENT 
A. Improve Team Collaboration 
Each cycling team is an independent entity with no relationship to the 
other teams outside of the loosely bound and weak AIGCP. As a result of 
the issues discussed in this Article, team turnover is quite common. Fur-
thermore, because the UCI only issues eighteen ProTour licenses, teams 
are in competition off the road as well. Nevertheless, team continuity and 
stability are essential to drawing and maintaining fan interest, and ulti-
mately the sport’s health. Collaboration among teams could help to con-
solidate resources and to form a united front on issues important to the 
teams during discussions with riders, the UCI, and race organizers. 
The NFL, NBA, and NHL have salary caps that limit the amount of 
money a team can spend on its players.285 The agreements among the 
                                                                                                             
 285. See NFL CBA, supra note 114, art. XXIV, § 4, at 96–102 (setting salary cap at 
58% of Total Revenues in 2010); NBA CBA, supra note 114, art. VII, § 2 at 120–25 
(setting salary cap at 51% of Basketball-Related Income in 2011–2012); NHL CBA, 
supra note 114, art. 50, § 50.4, at 193–197 (designating Players’ Share as 54–57% of 
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teams to restrict player salaries would violate Section 1 of the Sherman 
Act but can exist so long as the salary cap is agreed to as part of a CBA 
pursuant to the non-statutory labor exemption. The players associations 
agree to the caps in exchange for a guarantee that the players will receive 
a minimum percentage of certain league revenues.286 While the guaran-
tees are relatively modest (50% in the NFL, 75% of the salary cap in the 
NBA, and 54–57% percent in the NHL), in practice, most teams spend to 
the limit of the salary cap. 
The Union of European Football Associations announced in May 2011 
that it intended to unilaterally implement a salary cap, becoming the first 
European sports league to do so.287 The main purpose of the salary cap is 
to place all teams on equal financial footing and prevent the highest rev-
enue teams in the biggest cities from signing the best players. Cycling, 
too, would benefit from a salary cap which would help ensure that the 
wealthiest teams cannot hoard the best riders and effectively bankrupt 
poorer teams. 
A salary cap would put all cycling teams in a more equal financial set-
ting while also providing teams and sponsors with better expectations 
about the present and future costs of cycling. Riders should also favor a 
salary cap similar to the ones used in the United States. While it may re-
strict salaries, a cap can stabilize teams and guarantee the riders a portion 
of cycling revenues. By guaranteeing the riders a portion of team in-
come, it creates a valuable partnership between the riders and the teams. 
Both parties will have every incentive to increase revenues in the 
sport.288 
A negotiated salary cap in cycling should be exempt from scrutiny pur-
suant to the EC non-statutory labor exemption. Such a salary cap would 
easily satisfy the first three elements of the EC non-statutory labor ex-
                                                                                                             
Hockey Related Revenues). It is important to point out that each league calculates and 
includes different revenue sources in the fund of revenues ultimately divided amongst the 
players. For example, in the NFL CBA, 10% of TR is deducted before calculating the 
salary cap. NFL CBA, supra note 114, art. XXIV, § 1(a)(xiv)(1)(A), at 92. 
 286. NFL CBA, supra note 114, art. XXIV, § 3, at 95; NBA CBA, supra note 114, art. 
VII, § 2(b)(1) at 122 (setting minimum at 75% of the salary cap); NHL CBA, supra note 
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 287. David Zaring, Can American Soccer Fans Bring Antitrust Claims Against Euro-
pean Football For Financial Fair Play?, CONGLOMERATE (May 25, 2011), 
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 288. In reality, the riders and teams must recognize that doping for short-term gains 
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and sponsors. See supra notes 13–14 and accompanying text. 
2011] AMERICAN STRUCTURE FOR PRO CYCLING 109 
emption: (1) the existence of a CBA between management and labor; (2) 
that the CBA was reached in good faith; and (3) that the CBA affects 
core subjects of collective bargaining.289 The fourth element—that the 
CBA does not directly affect third markets and third parties—is less 
clear. A salary cap could affect those that are not a party to the CBA, 
such as not-yet-professional cyclists, by depressing the salaries they 
could earn upon their entry into the professional realm. However, the 
salary cap is not designed for that purpose and the harm to these young 
cyclists should not be considered direct. 
All Big Four leagues have a degree of revenue sharing. All the leagues 
equally divide the revenues from the national television contracts but 
have varying policies concerning gate receipts and local revenues. Again, 
cycling teams lack substantial revenue streams because they do not host 
events. Nevertheless, if teams work collaboratively to increase revenues, 
they should consider ways in which to share revenues in an effort to pro-
vide stability to teams and the sport. If teams were more financially sta-
ble and proactive, it is not inconceivable that they could obtain an equity 
interest in cycling events so as to procure more revenues. 
A salary cap or revenue sharing arrangement could help provide finan-
cial stability to the teams by allowing them to appreciate in value over 
time. Unfortunately, the AIGCP performs almost none of the roles that 
the NFL serves for its member teams, notably negotiating television and 
licensing agreements and negotiating a CBA with the players. The NFL 
generates tremendous revenue and provides important stability to the 
league and its member teams by performing these and other tasks for the 
teams. The AIGCP should serve as a centralized resource for its teams to 
share best practices and provide guidance and oversight in the sport. The 
AIGCP instead relinquishes its legal authority to control and influence 
the sport to the UCI. 
B. Change the Transfer Period 
Presently, even though rider contracts run concurrent to calendar years, 
riders and teams are permitted to begin negotiating a contract during the 
current season for the following year beginning August 1.290 In American 
sports, contracts expire during the offseason, at which point teams may 
negotiate with the players. The August 1 date most likely exists for prac-
tical reasons as it is right after the Tour de France in July, during which 
all the interested parties in the world of cycling are together in one place, 
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 290. UCI Regulations, Part II, supra note 28, ch. XV, § 4, art. 2.15.120(a), at 106. 
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including riders, teams, and sponsors.291 As a result, there are many high 
profile contracts announced between riders and their new teams in early 
August. 
However, these changes are announced just weeks before the Vuelta a 
España, one of cycling’s three Grand Tours and biggest events. The 
change of a rider from his existing team to another team for the follow-
ing season generally means that rider will not be participating in that 
year’s Vuelta. For example, Alberto Contador announced in early August 
2010 that he was leaving Astana for Saxo Bank-SunGard. Consequently, 
Contador did not compete for Astana at the 2010 Vuelta even though it is 
a race he won in 2008. This current timing is detrimental. 
The transfer period should begin in late September, at the earliest, to 
allow for the completion of the Vuelta. While many years ago it may 
have been practical to negotiate while at the Tour de France, the highly 
connected world of smartphones, email, and text messages, enables ne-
gotiations from a distance. Alternatively, negotiations could occur at the 
Vuelta. In addition, transfer payments are not permitted in cycling and 
teams do not trade riders further showing the lack of a legitimate need 
for the current transfer date. 
Moving the transfer period until after the Vuelta should spark greater 
interest in the Vuleta as sponsors, team personnel, and typically non-
participating riders might feel compelled to attend on the cusp of the 
transfer period. Moreover, fans may become more interested as transfer 
rumors heat up around the event or more successful riders choose to par-
ticipate in the Vuelta. There is no realistic danger of stealing any of the 
Tour de France’s spotlight, whose history and prestige carries the sport. 
Teams also need to negotiate with potential sponsors for the following 
year. Starting the transfer period six weeks later should not seriously 
hinder this process. Furthermore, a sponsor’s willingness to cut the check 
is obviously tied to the success of the team and the riders on the team. 
For example, again, Saxo Bank decided to remain a sponsor of Riis Cy-
cling only after Riis was able to sign Alberto Contador. However, spon-
sors do not presently consider association with the Vuelta to be a major 
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factor since most sponsorship decisions are made before the race. If the 
transfer period, and consequently the sponsorship negotiation period, was 
delayed until after the Vuelta, the Vuelta may be considered a more im-
portant event and its results could be more appropriately considered in 
sponsorship deals. 
The sport of cycling ultimately revolves around the Tour de France. 
However, the current transfer period undermines one of its three most 
important events. Moving the date until after the Vuelta a España would 
allow the Vuelta to grow in importance and prestige creating a more bal-
anced schedule that grabs and holds fan attention. 
C. Increase the Creativity in Contractual Provisions 
EC law regards the free movement of workers to be a fundamental 
right that cannot be compromised, even through collective bargaining.292 
Consequently, a reserve system such as those used in the Big Four, 
whereby a team controls an athlete’s rights for the first few years of an 
athlete’s career, would not be legal under EC law. Nevertheless, rider 
continuity is important to the stability of the sport from a team, sponsor, 
or fan perspective. Furthermore, there are other ways in which teams can 
control rider movement as part of a CBA with the CPA. 
In the NFL, unlike MLB, the NBA, or the NHL, contracts are not 
guaranteed. A player’s contract can be terminated if the player engages 
in activities other than the contracted professional sport that may involve 
a significant risk of personal injury.293 Even when players are injured in 
the sport that they play professionally, they are often released and go 
through an injury grievance process to determine their appropriate com-
pensation.294 Accordingly, the major issue in NFL contract negotiations 
is the portion of money to be “guaranteed.”295 Contracts or bonuses can 
be guaranteed against termination in the event of injury, diminished skill, 
or a salary cap charge that is too large for the team.296 While the team can 
still cut the player, the player will still be paid if certain portions of his 
contract were guaranteed.297 
The length of an NFL contract is superficial as a result of its mostly 
non-guaranteed nature. Although a player may sign a six-year deal, due 
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to the high injury rate and rapid turnover in talent, the chances of the 
player actually completing the contract are not great. To offset the risk, 
most contracts have incentive and bonus provisions that reward the play-
er financially if he performs well.298 The sport of cycling should use sim-
ilar contract structures. 
Cycling teams generally sign riders to one or two-year contracts as an-
ything longer would be a financial commitment that most teams cannot 
make alongside their one or two year sponsorship deals. Through non-
guaranteed contracts that provide an upside to the riders in the case of 
good performance, teams could control riders for longer durations. Rid-
ers’ careers are short and their desperation for employment is what has 
already caused them to allow the UCI to control the sport in place of a 
CBA. Therefore, riders are unlikely to complain very long or loud about 
a change in the structure of their contracts. Nevertheless, this change can 
and should be negotiated in a CBA with the CPA. 
In a related contractual issue, UCI rules prohibit contract negotiations 
between a team and a rider except for during the specified transfer peri-
od.299 However, it is quite clear that these rules are not enforced. Prior to 
the 2010 season, Bradley Wiggins left the Garmin-Slipstream team for 
the new Team Sky based in his native England. Team Sky made known 
their desire for the British Wiggins to lead their new team amidst his sur-
prise fourth place overall performance at the Tour de France.300 Howev-
er, Wiggins was still under contract to Garmin-Slipstream for one more 
year. 
The UCI failed to enforce its pseudo non-tampering provision and 
Garmin-Slipstream considered litigation to prevent Sky’s poaching of 
Wiggins.301 Ultimately, Team Sky reached a financial settlement with 
Garmin-Slipstream and Wiggins signed a four-year deal with the finan-
cially robust Team Sky.302 However, the UCI’s failure to have and en-
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force an effective non-tampering provision hurt the stability of the sport 
and caused dissension among the teams. 
D. Revenue Generation 
There are other business operation improvements that professional cy-
cling would benefit from implementing, beyond those made through a 
CBA. Most notably, certain changes could enable higher television reve-
nues. Television broadcast revenues are among the most important and 
lucrative sources of revenue in American sports.303 For this to be the 
case, the Sports Broadcasting Act provides the Big Four leagues an im-
portant exemption from antitrust laws. This exemption permits individual 
teams and potential competitors to pool their rights and sell them collec-
tively. If professional cycling had a more American structure whereby 
the league and the events existed only as a function of the individual 
teams, it too would possibly need some type of exemption from antitrust 
or competition law. 
However, as detailed throughout this Article, the teams do not create or 
control the events—the UCI and event organizers, such as ASO, do. 
Since ASO is a single entity, it can and does collectively sell the rights to 
many of its events. For example, in 2010 Versus broadcast eight of 
ASO’s fourteen professional cycling events.304 ASO is able to leverage 
the importance of broadcasting the Tour de France into forcing Versus or 
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broadcasters in other countries to broadcast ASO’s lesser known events. 
It is the failure of the UCI to do something similar which continues to 
deprive the UCI of meaningful revenues. 
Most of the events on the UCI WorldTour are organized by separate, 
individual entities. Consequently, these individual entities cannot collec-
tively combine to sell the television rights to their events without violat-
ing EC antitrust law. The individual race organizers are effectively the 
same as the thirty-two separate NFL teams in that they each possess val-
uable rights to an event. The Sports Broadcasting Act provides Big Four 
sports teams the important ability to sell the television rights to their 
events collectively. Television networks are far more interested—and 
pay far more—to broadcast games for the entire league and concomitant 
sponsorship rather than just a few teams. The consistent message that a 
certain television network is the exclusive broadcaster for a certain 
league’s games is valuable and provides valuable national exposure for 
sponsors. Legislation similar to the Sports Broadcasting Act would like-
wise be necessary in the EC. While the EC takes a hard-line on antitrust 
issues, they also take a hard-line on doping in sports. EC legislators and 
regulators would have to recognize that legislation similar to the Sports 
Broadcasting Act would provide important financial stability to the sport 
of cycling—which could help reduce the doping scandals. 
In addition, the UCI should look to purchase and control more events. 
The events would provide the UCI with a valuable source of revenue 
and, if they controlled enough major events, they could then sell them 
collectively without running afoul of antitrust laws. The ASO derives 
substantial revenue from its ability to collectively sell the television 
rights to its events. If the UCI could do the same, it could gain leverage 
against the ASO and make the UCI WorldTour a more legitimate and 
sustainable enterprise. 
CONCLUSION 
Cycling is one of the world’s favorite sports. It has withstood countless 
scandals questioning the legitimacy of its champions and races. Never-
theless, those scandals continue to cast a dark shadow over the sport’s 
governance and sustainability. The stability and sustainability of the 
sport of cycling continues to be threatened by the sport’s antiquated sys-
tems which have placed nearly all of the power in the hands of event or-
ganizers, rather than the teams and riders. American sports have been 
largely successful in creating a shared and lucrative partnership between 
teams and athletes through the collective bargaining process. Cycling 
teams and cyclists need to do the same. By adopting some of the Ameri-
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can approaches to professional sports, cycling could take steps towards a 
cleaner and more stable sport. 
 
